A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases by Johns, Margaret Z.
SMU Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 1 Article 6
2006
A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper
Expansion of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-
Judges in Civil-Rights Cases
Margaret Z. Johns
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights
Cases, 59 SMU L. Rev. 265 (2006)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol59/iss1/6
A BLACK ROBE Is NOT A BIG TENT:
THE IMPROPER EXPANSION OF ABSOLUTE
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY TO NON-JUDGES
IN CIVIL-RIGHTS CASES
Margaret Z. Johns*
N civil-rights cases, absolute judicial immunity has been extended to
many defendants who are not judges, including psychologists, social
workers, mediators, receivers, probation officers, and licensing and
parole-board members. This expansion of the immunity defense seri-
ously undermines civil-rights enforcement, denies victims a remedy, and
hinders the development of constitutional standards. It departs from the
Supreme Court's decisions circumscribing the scope of absolute judicial
immunity and cannot be justified by either historical understandings or
policy arguments. Yet, surprisingly, this unwarranted expansion of abso-
lute immunity has been ignored by the Supreme Court and has escaped
scholarly criticism.
This Article examines the extension of absolute judicial immunity to
two categories of non-judges: (a) court adjuncts and appointees within
the judicial system who are not decision-makers; and (b) decision-makers
outside of the judicial system where procedural safeguards are lacking. It
explains that these decisions fail to satisfy the Supreme Court's require-
ments for establishing the entitlement to judicial immunity. It then pro-
poses that this unjustified expansion of judicial immunity should be
corrected by the adoption of a qualified-immunity regime that protects
honest officials from excessive litigation, while allowing the vigorous en-
forcement of civil-rights remedies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To insure fearless and independent decision-making, the United States
Supreme Court grants judges absolute immunity from civil-rights lawsuits
by disgruntled litigants, trusting that procedural safeguards, including ad-
versary proceedings and appellate review, will prevent and correct most
constitutional violations.1 In scores of cases, however, lower courts have
extended this absolute immunity to an increasing number of non-judges,
including psychologists, social workers, mediators, receivers, probation
officers, and licensing and parole-board members. Under this extension
of immunity, these officials escape liability even when they have mali-
ciously violated constitutional protections. For example, in a child-cus-
tody case, a social worker who falsified the results of a plaintiff's
1. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
363-64 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); see infra Part II.B.
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evaluation and omitted positive information from the report was granted
absolute immunity.2 A court-appointed commissioner charged with sell-
ing property following a divorce received absolute immunity even when
defectively advertising the sale, illegally participating in the sale, and ly-
ing to the court. 3 A court-appointed receiver who was investigating a
judgment debtor's assets received absolute judicial immunity after break-
ing into the debtor's girlfriend's storage locker and seizing $5600 in cash,
an oil painting and family jewelry.4 Other courts have refused to adopt
this expansive application of absolute judicial immunity, which has cre-
ated circuit splits. 5 Surprisingly, this unwarranted expansion of the de-
fense and the resulting conflicts have not been addressed by the Supreme
Court and have rarely been considered in the scholarly literature.
This article argues that this expansion of absolute judicial immunity is
wrong for three reasons. First, it misinterprets Supreme Court decisions
that limit the application of the doctrine to the core judicial decision-
making function.6 Second, it ignores the historical common-law applica-
tion of the doctrine, which is the sole basis for extending judicial immu-
nity to civil-rights cases. 7 Third, it frustrates the enforcement of civil-
rights laws by denying victims a remedy, failing to deter future constitu-
tional violations, and hindering the development of constitutional
standards. 8
Instead of this misguided expansion of judicial immunity, this article
proposes that the doctrine be confined to the judicial decision-making
function where sufficient procedural safeguards offset the risk of constitu-
tional violations. Absolute immunity should not be extended to officials
who are not performing this core judicial function or who are not con-
strained by procedural safeguards comparable to those inherent in the
judicial process. Rather, these officials should be afforded qualified im-
munity that shields them from liability so long as they do not violate
clearly established laws that a reasonable officer would have known.9
This potent defense "provides ample protection to all but the plainly in-
competent or those who knowingly violate the law." 10 The historical
common-law immunity doctrine supports this application of qualified im-
munity. Moreover, it strikes the proper balance between shielding gov-
ernment officials from excessive exposure to civil litigation while
2. Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125-28 (3d Cir. 2001).
3. Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476-77 (7th Cir. 1980).
4. Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 371-74 (5th Cir. 1995).
5. For example, circuits are split on the proper immunity to apply to child-protective
workers, to parole-board members performing certain duties, to medical peer-review com-
mittee members, to medical-board members, and to land-use officials. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).




protecting the constitutional rights of victims injured by clearly unconsti-
tutional misconduct.
As background for understanding the current immunity doctrine and
its proper scope, Part II briefly describes development of civil-rights lia-
bility under § 1983 and the Court's application of common-law judicial
immunity to shield judges from civil-rights liability. Part III describes the
improper expansion of judicial immunity to two categories of non-judges:
(a) court adjuncts and appointees within the judicial system; and (b) deci-
sion-makers outside of the judicial system where procedural safeguards
are lacking. Part IV argues that this unjustified expansion of judicial im-
munity should be corrected by the adoption of a qualified-immunity re-
gime which protects honest officials from excessive litigation, while
allowing the vigorous enforcement of civil rights remedies.
II. ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IN
CIVIL-RIGHTS CASES
This Part reviews the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity as applied
by the United States Supreme Court in civil-rights actions. Part I.A
briefly outlines the development of civil-rights liability under § 1983. Part
I.B describes the Court's application of absolute judicial immunity in
§ 1983 cases.
A. CIVIL-RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER § 1983
Until the Civil War, the constitutional protections of the Bill of Rights
applied only to the federal government and not to the States.1" Congress
enacted the Thirteenth Amendment at the close of the Civil War to out-
law slavery and transform the Emancipation Proclamation into a consti-
tutional right.12 But, despite the Thirteenth Amendment, a reign of
violence took hold in the South.13 In response, Congress adopted the
first Reconstruction civil-rights statute in 1866.14 Doubting its constitu-
tional authority to pass this statute, 15 Congress proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1866, which forbids States from denying citizens due pro-
cess and the equal protection of the law.16 In 1871, buttressed by the
constitutional authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress essen-
tially re-adopted the 1866 civil-rights statute that is codified today at 42
U.S.C. § 1983.17 These events transformed the national government. As
11. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-54 (1833).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
13. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-79 (1961).
14. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-
Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1985).
15. Id. at 6-8.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (2d
ed. 2002); Blackmun, supra note 14, at 4-5.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was originally enacted as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, 17 Stat. 13, which was essentially a re-enactment of the 1866 civil-rights statute. See
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171, 185; see also SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIB-
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Professor Tribe has explained, taken collectively, the Reconstruction
Amendments, the Civil Rights Acts, and these new jurisdictional statutes,
all emerging from the cauldron of the War Between the States, marked a
revolutionary shift in the relationship among individuals, the States, and
the Federal Government. 18
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress. 19
Though a revolutionary shift, § 1983 was essentially dormant for nearly
100 years.20 But in 1964, in Monroe v. Pape, the Court held that § 1983
applied despite the availability of a state remedy where police officers
abused their official authority and violated Mr. Monroe's civil rights.21
Since Monroe, § 1983 has been the most important remedy for civil-rights
violations by state and local officials.22 Furthermore, despite the absence
of statutory authority, a decade later, the Court adopted a companion
remedy for redressing violations by federal officials in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.23 While the
frequent use of these civil-rights remedies has not been without contro-
versy, 24 it seems highly unlikely that the Court will return to an interpre-
ERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 1.03 (2d ed. 1986) (explaining that § 1983
was patterned after the 1866 Civil Rights Act).
18. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-1 (3d ed. 2000).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
20. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); see also HAROLD S.
LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 2 (2001);
Blackmun, supra note 14, at 19-20.
21. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.165, 180, 191-92 (1861). In Monroe, thirteen Chicago
police officers broke into the Monroe home without a warrant, rousted the family, forced
the husband and wife to stand naked while they ransacked the home, and detained Mr.
Monroe at the police station for ten hours on "open charges" without allowing him to
make a phone call or appear before a magistrate judge. Id.
22. See David Achtenberg, Immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach
and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 497, 497 (1992).
23. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). In Bivens, acting without a warrant or probable cause,
narcotics agents arrested plaintiff using excessive force in front of his wife and children,
searched the family home, threatened to arrest the entire family, and strip-searched and
booked him. Id. at 389. For purposes of the immunity defenses, the Court treats § 1983
and Bivens actions the same. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n.2 (1986); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
24. See Blackmun, supra note 14, at 5 (arguing that §1983 was an important vehicle for
maintaining a federal forum for the protection of federal rights); John Jeffries, The Right-
Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1999) (arguing that courts
interpret constitutional rights narrowly in order to reduce government exposure to money
damages); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345-46, 348 (2000) (arguing that constitutional
torts have a limited deterrent effect and are not economically justified); James K. Park,
Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 396,
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tation that significantly diminishes their role in civil-rights enforcement
given their lengthy and well-established jurisprudence.
B. ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY IN 1983 ACTIONS
As § 1983 and Bivens actions came into frequent use, the Court consid-
ered whether common-law immunity defenses would be available to offi-
cials sued for civil-rights violations. 25 Nothing in the language of § 1983
suggests that Congress intended to extend official immunity defenses to
defendants in civil-rights actions. And the legislative history does not
demonstrate that Congress intended to preserve immunities. 26 Indeed,
since the entire goal of the statute was to impose liability on state officials
who violated constitutional rights, it seems doubtful that Congress in-
tended to insulate officials who violate civil rights by granting them
immunity.27
However, according to the Court, the 1871 Congress presumably acted
against the backdrop of the established common-law immunities.2 8 In the
Court's view, if Congress had intended to effect such a momentous
change in the law as eliminating common law-immunities, that would be
clear from the legislative history.2 9 Since the legislative record fails to
support this intent, the Court inferred from the congressional silence that
Congress intended to retain the common-law immunities. 30 For this rea-
son, the starting point for analyzing immunity defenses under § 1983 is
the relevant common law in 1871 when § 1983 was adopted.3 1
In addressing immunity issues, the Court has balanced the benefits of
civil liability-compensating victims and encouraging lawful conduct-
452-53 (2003) (arguing that monetary remedies for constitutional torts not only serve the
goals of compensation and deterrence, but also provide individual remedies that help spur
the development of constitutional rights, norms that regulate government action, and
structural solutions to systemic problems).
25. See generally Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410, 420 (1976) (applying absolute
immunity in a civil-rights case against a prosecutor); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247
(1974) (applying qualified immunity in a civil-rights case against an executive officer); Pier-
son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (applying absolute immunity in a civil-rights case
against a judge).
26. Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 502-11; see Pierson, 386 U.S. at 559-60 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under § 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 325-28 (1969).
27. Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 502; see Pierson, 386 U.S. at 559-60 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 382-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Note, Liability of Judicial
Officers Under § 1983, supra note 26, at 325-28.
28. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
484-85 (1991); see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
29. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268-69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484-85; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356;
Tennev. 341 U.S. at 376.
30. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268-69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484-85; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356;
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. With respect to judicial immunity, it is not at all clear that the
common law granted judges absolute immunity in 1871. See infra note 43. Nor is it clear
that Congress intended to insulate judges from civil-rights liability. Indeed, to the extent
that there is legislative history on the point, it suggests that Congress intended to impose
liability on judges under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id.
31. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997); see Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268; Burns,
500 U.S. at 484-85; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-18 (1976).
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against its undesirable consequences-intimidating decision-makers and
undermining their independence. 32 As the Court has explained,
[a]ware of the salutary effects that the threat of liability can have,
however, as well as the undeniable tension between official immuni-
ties and the ideal of the rule of law, this Court has been cautious in
recognizing claims that government officials should be free of the
obligation to answer for their acts in court. 33
For this reason, the Court has been "quite sparing" in recognizing claims
to absolute immunity.34 Moreover, since the justification for continuing
the immunity doctrines in civil-rights cases is the presumed intent of Con-
gress in 1871, expansion of absolute immunity beyond its 1871 scope is
unsupportable. 35
While the Court grants absolute immunity sparingly, it has held that
some officers perform special functions requiring a full exemption from
liability.36 In evaluating claims for absolute immunity, the Court
presumes that "qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to
protect government officials in the exercise of their duties"'37 and requires
the proponent of the claim to "bear the burden of establishing the justifi-
cation for such immunity. '38 To determine whether that burden has been
met, the Court undertakes "'a considered inquiry into the immunity his-
torically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests
behind it.' '39 According to the Court, absolute immunity is "strong
medicine" that is justified only when the threat to effective performance
of office is "very great."'40
The Court found that this "strong medicine" was justified to protect
judges from civil liability.41 In the Court's view, "[f]ew doctrines were
more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges
from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial juris-
diction. ' 42 The doctrine reflects the need for an independent judiciary
32. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1987).
33. Id. at 223-24.
34. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 n.4 (1993) (quoting Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991)); Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224.
35. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 497-98 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Buckley, 509 U.S. at 279-80 (Scalia, J., concurring).
36. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
37. Antoine, 508 U.S. at 432 n.4 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 486-487).
38. Id. at 432.
39. Id. (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 508).
40. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 230 (quoting Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union,
792 F.2d 647, 660 (1986) (Posner, J., dissenting)).
41. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
42. Id. at 553-54. This conclusion is debated in the scholarly literature. Douglas K.
Barth, Immunity of Federal and State Judges from Civil Suit-Time for a Qualified Immu-
nity?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 732-33 n.29 (1977) (explaining that inferior court
judges were liable for malicious acts during the nineteenth century); accord Note, Liability
of Judicial Officers Under § 1983, supra note 26, at 325 n.25. Moreover, even assuming
absolute judicial immunity had been solidly established in the English common law, it is




By 1871, thirteen states had adopted the absolute immunity rule; six states
had ruled that judges were liable if they acted maliciously; in nine states
courts had faced the issue but had not ruled clearly one way or the other; and
nine states had apparently not yet faced the issue.
Id. at 326-27; see also Feinman & Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C. L. REV.
201, 237 (1980). This analysis has been criticized by Professor J. Randolph Block, who
argues that the states had uniformly adopted judicial immunity for both superior and infer-
ior judges when they performed judicial acts, but that inferior judges were liable if they
acted with malice in performing administrative duties. In his view, the language in cases
suggesting that absolute immunity did not apply to judicial acts of inferior-court judges was
merely dicta. J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity,
1980 DUKE L. J. 879, 887-91, 899 (1980).
In terms of federal law, there was only one Supreme Court decision on the issue as of
1871 when § 1983 was adopted. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). In Ran-
dall, the Court stated that judges of general or superior courts "are not liable to civil ac-
tions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, unless
perhaps where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly." Id. at
536. In other words, if a conscientious congressman undertook to research the federal law
on judicial immunity on the eve of passage of § 1983, he would have found that qualified
immunity applied. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under § 1983, supra note 26, at 326.
Indeed, the first Supreme Court decision adopting absolute judicial immunity was decided
the year after § 1983 was adopted. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
Moreover, the legislative history of § 1983 suggests that Congress intended to impose
liability on judges for civil rights violations. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 562-63 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting.); Dan B. Kates, Jr., Immunity of State Judges under the Federal Civil Rights Acts:
Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 615, 620 n.19 (1970), quoted in Mark D.
Thompson, Note, Judges-Judicial Malpractice? Judicial Immunity, Injunctive Relief, and
Attorney's Fees under the Civil Rights Statutes, 14 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 588, 591 n.24 (1984);
see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 365-66 (1871), quoted in Thompson, supra, at 591
n.24; Barth, supra, at 738. Congressman Lewis of Kentucky thought that under [§ 1983]
"the judge of a state court, though acting under oath of office, is made liable to a suit in
Federal court and subject to damages for his decision against a suitor." Congressman Thur-
mond of South Carolina pointed out that under the 1866 act
there have been two or three instances already under the civil rights bill of
State judges being taken into the United States district court, sometimes
upon indictment for the offense... of honestly and conscientiously deciding
the law to be as they understood it to be . . . . Is [section 1] intended to
perpetuate that? Is it intended to enlarge it? Is it intended to extend it so
that no longer a judge sitting on the bench to decide causes can decide them
free from any fear except that of impeachment, which never lies in the ab-
sence of corrupt motive? Is that to be extended so that every judge of a State
may be liable to be dragged before some Federal judge to vindicate his opin-
ion and to be mulct [penalized] in damages if that Federal judge shall think
the opinion was erroneous? That is the language of this bill.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 217 (1871), quoted in Pierson, 386 U.S. at 562
(Douglas, J., dissenting) and Thompson, supra, at 592 n.24. As Justice Douglas explained,
"The position that Congress did not intend to change the common-law rule of judicial
immunity ignores the fact that every member of congress who spoke to the issue assumed
that the words of the statute meant what they said and that judges would be liable." Pier-
son, 386 U.S. at 561. "In light of the sharply contested nature of the issue of judicial immu-
nity it would be reasonable to assume that the judiciary would have been expressly
exempted from the wide sweep of the section, if Congress had intended such a result." Id.
at 563. Indeed, no one supporting § 1983 contradicted the view of its opponents that
judges would be held liable. Kates, supra, at 620 n.19, quoted in Thompson, supra, at 592
n.24.
While it is not my intent to criticize the adoption of absolute judicial immunity for state
and federal judges, others have argued that absolute immunity should be replaced by quali-
fied immunity and modified in some other respects. See generally Barth, supra, at 729;
Kates, supra, at 615; Joseph Katten, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities
of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 941 (1977); Michael
Robert King, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal for Limited Liability,
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and finality in judicial proceedings. 43 Based on this historical doctrine,
the Court imposes two requirements for the immunity to attach: (1) the
challenged conduct must be a "judicial act"; and (2) it must not have been
performed in the "complete absence of all authority. 44
These two requirements have been expansively interpreted. Specifi-
cally, a "judicial act" is one that is a function normally performed by a
judge and within the expectations of the parties. 45 Under the interpreta-
tion announced in Stump v. Sparkman, a judge performed a judicial act in
ordering the sterilization of a young girl on the ex parte application of her
mother. 46 In the Court's view, entering a court order on the request of a
party qualifies as a judicial act since entering orders is a normal judicial
function and the mother expected the judge to enter it.47
But not everything a judge does in the course of employment is a judi-
cial act. The Court has stressed that the purpose of judicial immunity is
to protect the adjudicative function from exposure to harassing litigation
by disappointed litigants who are protected by the alternative remedy of
appellate review.48 Where the adjudicative function is not at issue, judi-
cial immunity does not apply.49 For example, personnel actions taken by
a judge are characterized as administrative functions, and therefore
outside the protection of judicial immunity. 50 For this reason, where a
judge dismissed a probation officer and discriminated against her on the
basis of sex, the Court held that his conduct was not protected by abso-
lute immunity. 51 Likewise, when judges promulgate rules for profes-
sional conduct, they are not protected by judicial immunity because that
function is administrative, not adjudicative. 52
For the second requirement, complete absence of jurisdiction, the
Court has held that acting in excess of jurisdiction is not sufficient to de-
feat absolute immunity.53 As the Court explained, if a criminal court
20 ARIz. L. REV. 421 (1978); K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-
First Century, 39 How. L.J. 95 (1995) (proposing personal liability for judges); Irene
Merker Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 VA. L. REV.
833 (1978) (arguing that correctability on appeal should be required for absolute immunity
to apply); Frank Way, A Call for Limits to Judicial Immunity: Must Judges Be King in their
Courts?, 64 JUDICATURE 390 (1981).
43. Joseph Romagnoli, What Constitutes a Judicial Act for Purposes of Judicial Immu-
nity, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1503, 1503 (1985).
44. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).
45. Id. at 362; Romagnoli, supra note 43, at 1503.
46. Stump, 435 U.S. at 360-63. The girl was told that she was having an appendectomy
and found out the truth only after she was married and unable to conceive children. Id. at
353. Justices Stewart and Powell dissented on the grounds that the ex parte procedure de-
nied the plaintiff all of the procedural protections associated with the formal judicial pro-
cess. Id. at 364-70 (Stewart, J. & Powell, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 362.
48. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988).
49. See id. at 227-28.
50. Id. at 229-30.
51. Id.
52. See Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719,
731 (1980).
53. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57.
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judge convicted a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be
acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.54 On the other
hand, if a probate judge with jurisdiction limited to wills and estates were
to try a criminal case, she would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdic-
tion and would not be entitled to absolute immunity.5 5 But in cases
where the judge has a broad grant of general jurisdiction to hear "all
cases at law and in equity whatsoever" the jurisdiction requirement is
satisfied despite the absence of a specific common law or statutory basis
for the exercise of jurisdiction.56 Thus, in Stump, the judge of a court of
general jurisdiction did not act in complete absence of all authority al-
though no specific provision authorized the sterilization order.57
Under its functional approach to the immunity doctrines, the Court has
extended the protection of judicial immunity to government officials who
perform the function of a judge when the proceedings provide compara-
ble procedural safeguards. 58 Specifically, in Butz v. Economou, the Court
held that federal administrativ-law judges were entitled to judicial immu-
nity.59 The Court concluded that federal agency proceedings were func-
tionally the same as judicial proceedings, and therefore administrative-
law judges should have their independence protected by absolute immu-
nity.60 This expansion of judicial immunity was justified because agency
proceedings provide "many of the same safeguards as are available in the
judicial process. '61 These included: adversary proceedings; a trier of fact
insulated from political pressure; the right to present evidence; a tran-
script of proceedings; a statement of findings and conclusions on all issues
of fact, law, or discretion; and the right to agency or judicial review.62 As
the Court explained, "In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk
of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an agency hearing is clearly
outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent judgment of
these men and women. ' 63 The Court doubted that this extension of im-
munity would undermine civil-rights protections since "most judicial mis-
takes or wrongs are open to correction through ordinary mechanisms of
review, which are largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably asso-
ciated with exposing judges to personal liability."'64
The Court, however, has refused to extend judicial immunity to officers
within the judicial system who do not perform judicial functions or con-
duct proceedings outside of the judicial system that lack comparable pro-
cedural safeguards. For example, in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.,
54. Id. at 357 n.7 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S (13 Wall.) 335, 352 (1872)).
55. Id.
56. See id. at 357-59.
57. Id. at 359-60.
58. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978).
59. Id. at 513-14.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 513.
62. Id. at 516.
63. Id. at 514.
64. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).
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the Court refused to extend absolute judicial immunity to court report-
ers. 65 While the Court recognized the importance and difficulty of the
court reporter's job, it stressed that "the 'touchstone' for the [judicial im-
munity] doctrine's applicability has been 'performance of the function of
resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating pri-
vate rights."66 As the Court explained, court reporters perform an ad-
ministrative function and "do not exercise the kind of judgment that is
protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity. ' 67 In rejecting the claim
of absolute immunity, the Court reaffirmed its consistent view that abso-
lute immunity is to be sparingly granted, that qualified immunity is pre-
sumed to provide sufficient protection from excessive litigation, and that
the person seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that it
is justified. 68
Similarly, in Cleavinger v. Saxner,69 the Court rejected the argument
that absolute judicial immunity protected members of a prison's disci-
pline committee.7 0 The Court acknowledged that the members exercised
some functions analogous to the judicial function in conducting hearings,
receiving evidence, and determining guilt or innocence. 71 But it found
that the absence of safeguards comparable to those of the judicial process
foreclosed the application of absolute judicial immunity.72 Specifically,
the members were not independent, professional hearing officers like ad-
ministrative-law judges, but were "prison officials .. . temporarily di-
verted from their usual duties. '73 Although minimal safeguards were
provided,7 4 the Court found that the process contained few of the safe-
guards provided in the Administrative Procedure Act under considera-
tion in Butz.75 Moreover, the Court stressed the potency of the qualified-
immunity defense, which merely requires the official to comply with
clearly established constitutional law to avoid civil liability.76
Unfortunately, as the following discussion will show, the lower courts
have frequently disregarded the Supreme Court's limitations on the doc-
trine of absolute judicial immunity in several ways. They have also disre-
65. 508 U.S. 429, 438 (1993).
66. Id. at 435-36.
67. Id. at 436-37.
68. Id. at 432 n.4.
69. 474 U.S. 193 (1985).
70. Id. at 206. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White,
dissented. In their view, the realities of the prison environment justified the extension of
absolute immunity to members of the discipline committee. Id. at 208-12.
71. Id. at 203.
72. ld. at 206.
73. Id. at 203-04.
74. Id. at 206 ([Safeguards included] "the qualifications for committee service; prior
notice to the inmate; representation by a staff member; the right to present certain evi-
dence at the hearing; the right to be present; the requirement for a detailed record; the
availability of administrative review at three levels (demonstrated by the relief obtained on
review by these respondents at the first two levels); and the availability of ultimate review
in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.").
75. Id.
76. Id. at 207.
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garded the Stump requirement that judicial immunity be limited to
judicial acts in the performance of the judicial function. 77 They have dis-
regarded the Antoine rule that judicial immunity should not be extended
to participants in the judicial system who fail to meet the touchstone re-
quirement of resolving disputes between parties or authoritatively adjudi-
cating private rights.78 And, they have ignored the Cleavinger rule against
extending judicial immunity to decision-makers outside of the judicial
system where the proceedings lack safeguards comparable to those of the
judicial process.79
III. THE IMPROPER EXPANSION OF ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY IN CIVIL-RIGHTS CASES
This Part will discuss the wrongful expansion of absolute judicial immu-
nity in two categories of cases: (1) civil-rights actions against court ad-
juncts and appointees within the judicial system; and (2) civil-rights
actions against decision-makers in non-judicial proceedings lacking the
safeguards of the judicial process. In both, the lower courts have failed to
follow the Supreme Court's decisions limiting the application of the doc-
trine to the historical boundaries of absolute judicial immunity in 1871,
the sole basis for its application in § 1983 actions.
A. THE IMPROPER EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY TO
COURT APPOINTEES AND ADJUNCTS
A number of lower courts have granted absolute judicial immunity to
77. See infra Part III.A. For example, some lower courts have extended judicial immu-
nity to psychiatrists for providing medical opinions. See, e.g., Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d
889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (considering whether a therapist in a child-custody proceeding
should enjoy absolute immunity); Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125-27 (3d Cir. 2001)
(considering whether unlicensed psychologist evaluating foster children should receive ab-
solute immunity); Hunter v. Clark, No. 04-CV-0920SC, 2005 WL 1130488, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
May 5, 2005) (dismissing § 1983 claim against court-appointed psychiatrist who determined
that plaintiff was not competent to stand trial).
78. See infra Part III.A. For example, some lower courts have extended judicial immu-
nity to social workers and probation officers. Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 94 (1st
Cir. 2002) (evaluating the immunity of social workers and concluding "that the information
gathering, reporting, and recommending tasks of both are similar in nature and purpose to
those of a guardian ad litem and qualify to confer absolute quasi-judicial immunity");
Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126-28 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that social workers enjoyed
absolute judicial immunity for custody evaluations); Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 775-
76 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Probation and parole officers are entitled to absolute immunity when
they are engaged in adjudicatory duties.").
79. See infra Part !I!.B. For example, some lower courts have extended judicial immu-
nity to parole boards. Johnson v. R.I. Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1987)
("We join those circuit courts which have addressed this issue and conclude that the defen-
dant parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages in
a § 1983 action for actions taken within the proper scope of their official duties."); Robin-
son v. Fahey, 366 F. Supp. 2d 368, 371 (E.D. Va. 2005) ("All of the defendants are members
of the Virginia Board of Parole who are being sued on account of decisions they made in
determining whether Robinson should be granted parole. Consequently, they are entitled
to absolute immunity...").
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court adjuncts and appointees, including medical experts,80 child-protec-
tive workers,81 receivers,82 mediators,83 and parole and probation of-
ficers. 84 As the following discussion shows, these defendants fail to
qualify for absolute immunity because they cannot establish the required
1871 counterpart, they do not perform judicial acts in the discharge of the
judicial function, and they are not constrained by procedural safeguards
required to offset the danger of unchecked constitutional violations.
1. Mental-Health Experts
Courts have frequently been required to determine which immunity
defense applies to court-appointed medical experts in child abuse and
custody proceedings 5 and criminal prosecutions where competency is at
issue. 86 Of the circuit courts to have addressed the issue in published de-
80. See infra Part II.A.1.
81. See infra Part III.A.2.
82. See infra Part III.A.3.
83. See infra Part II.A.4.
84. See infra Part II.A.5.
85. See e.g., Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898-900 (9th Cir. 2003) (reh'g en banc)
(considering whether a therapist in a child-custody proceeding should enjoy absolute im-
munity); Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125-27 (3d Cir. 2001) (considering whether an
unlicensed psychologist evaluating foster children should receive absolute immunity).
86. See, e.g., Hunter v. Clark, No. 04-CV-0920SC, 2005 WL 1130488, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
May 5, 2005) (dismissing a § 1983 claim against court-appointed psychiatrists who deter-
mined that the plaintiff was not competent to stand trial); Tammy Lander, Note, Do Court-
Appointed Mental Health Professionals Get a Free Ride in the Third Circuit? An Examina-
tion of the Latest Extensions of Judicial Immunity, 22 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 895 (2004); see
also Morstad v. Dep't of Corr., 147 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a psycholo-
gist who evaluated a convicted sex offender in connection with parole revocation proceed-
ing was entitled to absolute immunity).
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cisions, the Third,8 7 Seventh,8 8 Eighth,89 and Tenth Circuits90 grant these
experts absolute judicial immunity. While the Ninth Circuit previously
extended absolute immunity to court-appointed psychiatrists, 91 a recent
decision suggests that medical experts do not normally perform judicial
or prosecutorial functions that enjoyed absolute immunity at common
87. Hughes, 242 F.3d at 126-28 (applying absolute judicial immunity to a court-ap-
pointed child custody evaluator and unlicensed psychologist appointed by the evaluator on
the grounds that they functioned as arms of the court); D.T.B. v. Farmer, 114 F. App'x 446,
447 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a court-appointed psychologist was entitled to absolute
immunity under Hughes v. Long); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that a prison doctor who conducted a psychiatric exam on an inmate at the court's
request enjoyed absolute judicial immunity); see also Williams v. Consovoy, 333 F. Supp.
2d 297, 302 (D.N.J. 2004) (finding that a private psychologist conducting a psychological
assessment at the behest of Parole Board (a "quasi-judicial body itself immune from § 1983
actions") was entitled to absolute judicial immunity); Pierson v. Members of Delaware
County, No. 99-3435, 2000 WL 486608, at *4 (E.D. Pa. April 25, 2000) ("Dr. Wiesner made
his [competency] evaluation at the request of the court, and his report was furnished to the
court. Dr. Wiesner was thus functioning as an arm of the court, and as an integral part of
the judicial process he is protected by the same judicial immunity that protects the judge
who requested the evaluation."); P.T., A.T. & H.T. v. Richard Hall Cmty. Mental Health
Care Ctr., 364 N.J. Super. 460, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (affirming a lower-
court decision applying absolute judicial immunity to a court-appointed psychologist).
88. Duzynski v. Nosal, 324 F.2d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding that a mental-health
evaluator was entitled to judicial immunity).
89. Morstad v. Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 147 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Because
the court directed [the psychologist] to evaluate [appellant] and to testify at [appellant's]
probation revocation hearing, we conclude that [the psychologist] was performing func-
tions essential to the judicial process ... [and was] entitled to absolute immunity."); Moses
v. Parwatikar, M.D., 813 F.2d 891, 892 (8th Cir. 1987), disapproved on other grounds, Burns
v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991) (holding that absolute immunity protected a court-ap-
pointed psychiatrist who conducted a competency examination for both his "quasi-judicial
function" and his function as a witness); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-67 (8th Cir.
1987) ("[njonjudicial persons who fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the
judicial process have absolute immuit,, fr dlamage claims arising from their performance
of the delegated functions.").
90. Turney v. O'Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1474 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a psycholo-
gist was entitled to absolute immunity for performing a quasi-judicial role); Martinez v.
Roth, No. 94-2206, 1995 WL 261127, at *3 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995) (holding that a court-
appointed psychologist assisting the court in determining the best interest of the child was
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because his service was "'integral to the judi-
cial process"').
91. Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970).
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law.92 The Sixth Circuit applies absolute witness immunity.93 Research
has disclosed no published decisions of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits; however, unpublished decisions,
district-court decisions, and state-court decisions in those circuits gener-
ally apply absolute immunity.94 In my view, medical experts appointed to
assist the courts, where medical evaluations are required, should never
92. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898-900 (9th Cir. 2003) (reh'g en banc). In
Miller, the court considered whether absolute immunity applied when a social worker and
therapist placed a 12-year-old boy who was a known sexual predator in a foster home with
two small children without disclosing his dangerous tendencies. Id. at 893. In the initial
decision, the court followed its prior decisions granting blanket absolute immunity to the
defendants. Id. at 894. On rehearing, the en banc panel concluded that its prior circuit
authority conflicted with the functional approach adopted by the Supreme Court in An-
toine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993) and Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118
(1997). Id. at 896-98. It remanded the case for the district court to determine the functions
that the defendants performed since those functions were unclear from the pleadings. Id.
at 898. It indicated that if the therapist provided only treatment and diagnosis "[s]he ap-
parently is not alleged to have performed any quasi-judicial or prosecutorial function that
enjoyed absolute immunity at common law, unless discovery discloses that she performed
other functions more directly related to the prosecution of the dependency proceedings."
Id. at 898-99.
93. Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that a court-
appointed psychiatrist and psychologist were entitled to absolute immunity as witnesses
because they provided information to the court which is the function of a witness). In my
opinion, the court is correct in concluding that the proper functional analogy is to that of a
witness; but the court erred in extending witness immunity outside of the judicial phase of
the proceeding.
94. First Circuit: Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming the lower
court's dismissal of a claim against a court-appointed psychologist on other grounds, recog-
nizing the difficulty of the absolute-immunity question, and indicating that qualified immu-
nity is presumed to apply except for testimony in the judicial phase of the proceeding
where absolute witness immunity applies); Lalonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 207, 211-13
(1989) (extending absolute quasi-judicial immunity to a court-appointed psychiatrist in a
negligence action brought under Massachusetts law but citing federal immunity decisions).
Second Circuit: Kalman v. Carre, 352 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207-10 (D. Conn. 2005) (applying
absolute judicial immunity in action under the Americans with Disabilities Act against a
court-appointed psychiatrist by applying the holdings in civil-rights cases under section
1983); Hunter v. Clark, No. 04-CV-0920SC, 2005 WL 1130488, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 5,
2005) (dismissing a § 1983 claim against court-appointed psychiatrists who determined that
the plaintiff was not competent to stand trial). Fourth Circuit: Williams v. Rappeport, 699
F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Md. 1988) ("[Mental health experts] exercise a discretion similar to
that exercised by judges. Like judges, they require the insulation of absolute immunity to
assure the courageous exercise of their discretionary duties."). Fifth Circuit: Todd v.
Angelloz, 844 So. 2d 316, 321 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (finding a court-appointed expert enti-
tled to absolute judicial immunity for conduct in divorce proceedings (citing Myers v. Mor-
ris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987) (granting therapist absolute immunity in a federal civil
rights action))); Delcourt v. Silverman, 919 S.W.2d 777, 781-83 (Tex. 1996) (holding under
Texas law court-appointed psychologists are entitled to absolute immunity, citing numer-
ous federal civil rights cases); S.T.J. v. P.M., 556 So. 2d 244, 248 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (apply-
ing absolute judicial immunity in state-law claim based on court-appointed expert's
conduct in custody dispute and citing numerous federal authorities). Eleventh Circuit:
Dolin v. West, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 1998) ("Absolute immunity protects
witnesses, court-appointed psychologists, and guardians ad litem who are sued in their indi-
vidual capacities under section 1983" (citing Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th
Cir. 1984)). District of Columbia Circuit: Schinner v. Strathmann, 711 F. Supp. 1143, 1143-
44 (D.D.C. 1989) (granting court-appointed psychiatrist judicial immunity because "defen-
dant was acting in a judicial capacity when he interviewed the plaintiff to assist a judge in
evaluating a plaintiff's competency.").
2006]
SMU LAW REVIEW
receive absolute judicial immunity because there is no 1871 counterpart,
they do not perform the required decision-making function, and when
conducting investigations and examinations, they are not subject to the
procedural safeguards of the judicial process.
As the Court has repeatedly admonished, absolute immunity should
rarely be granted,95 and it should be limited to functions that were af-
forded absolute immunity under the common law in 1871.96 Under the
Court's functional approach, "the 'touchstone' for the [judicial immunity]
doctrine's applicability has been 'performance of the function of resolving
disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private
rights." 97 Specifically, in the first case applying judicial immunity to a
§ 1983 action, the Court explained:
It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are
brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the
most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on
appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may
hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing
such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fear-
less decision-making but to intimidation. 98
To confine the judicial immunity doctrine to the protection of the judi-
cial function, the Court requires that the challenged conduct satisfy the
requirements for a "judicial act." 99 To determine whether the judge per-
formed a judicial act, the Court considers two factors relating to "the na-
ture of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a
judge, and to the expectations of the parties; i.e., whether they dealt with
the judge in his judicial capacity."100 Examples of judicial acts include
sitting as trial judge and sentencing defendants,101 entertaining and ap-
proving petitions submitted by litigants, 10 2 disbarring an attorney as a
sanction for contempt of court, 103 ordering a police officer to bring an
attorney into the courtroom in connection with a pending case, 1°4 issuing
a search warrant,10 5 and entering a default judgment.10 6
On the other hand, many functions essential to the adjudication of
cases are not considered judicial acts. For example, the Supreme Court
has held that jury selection, which could be performed by a private per-
son, is not a judicial act.10 7 And in Forrester v. White, the Court held that
95. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
96. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976).
97. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993).
98. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
99. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
100. Id. at 362; Romagnoli, supra note 43, at 1503.
101. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553.
102. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 352-53, 364.
103. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1872).
104. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991).
105. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991).
106. Simmons v. Sacramento County Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1880).
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a judge's decision to dismiss a probation officer was not a judicial act
justifying absolute immunity.'08 As the Court explained, in discharging
the officer, the judge was acting in an administrative capacity. 109 "Those
acts-like many others involved in supervising court employees and over-
seeing the efficient operation of the court-may have been quite impor-
tant in providing the necessary conditions of a sound adjudicative system.
The decisions at issue, however, were not themselves judicial or
adjudicative."1 10
Turning to cases involving mental-health experts, the threshold judicial-
act requirement cannot be met. Mental-health experts do not perform
judicial acts in the discharge of the judicial function. They do not resolve
disputes between parties or authoritatively adjudicate private rights-the
touchstone for the judicial-immunity defense."1 They investigate and ex-
amine medical conditions, prepare reports of their findings, and testify in
court to provide expert opinions. These are not acts normally performed
by a judge and within the expectations of the parties. Indeed, were a
judge to conduct a medical examination to form an opinion of the case-
much less testify about the facts-it would constitute judicial miscon-
duct. 112 As one commentator observed, "Appellate courts frown on judi-
cial investigations, not only because they present an appearance of
partiality, but also because they may provide the judge with personal
knowledge of disputed facts, which is a specific ground for judicial
disqualification."' 13
Since medical experts do not perform judicial functions, we must con-
sider what functions they do perform to determine which immunity de-
fense to apply. Under the Court's functional approach, we consider the
function the defendant has performed and whether there is a historical
basis for applying absolute immunity when § 1983 was adopted.1 14 Here,
of course, neither psychiatrists nor psychologists were in the minds of the
1871 Congress when it adopted § 1983.115 The closest analogy for these
functions would be those of an investigator and witness. As the Court
has long held, the investigative function receives qualified, not absolute,
immunity.116 Witnesses, on the other hand, receive absolute immunity
108. 484 U.S. 219, 220-21 (1988).
109. Id. at 228.
110. Id. at 229
111. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993).
112. See Leslie W. Abramson, The Judicial Ethics of Ex Parte and Other Communica-
tions, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1343, 1366-69 (2000) (explaining that independent judicial investi-
gations violate the provision of MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 3(B)(7) cmt.
(1990)).
113. Id. at 1367-68 (footnotes omitted).
114. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1985) ("Our general approach to questions
of immunity under § 1983 is by now well established .... Our initial inquiry is whether an
official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the
privilege he asserts.").
115. EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF ASYLUM TO
THE AGE OF PROZAC (1997).
116. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) ("[W]hen a prosecutor performs
the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is 'neither
2006]
SMU LAW REVIEW
for testimony during the judicial phase of the proceeding. 117 But the ap-
plication of absolute witness immunity does not extend to nontestimonial
conduct nor to unsworn statements, not limited by the rules of evidence,
and not subject to cross-examination.1 18 These limitations reflect the
Court's insistence that absolute immunity can be justified only when it is
accompanied by sufficient procedural safeguards.119
This approach was adopted in 2000 in the unreported a district court
case of Metoyer v. Connick. 20 In Metoyer, the plaintiff was convicted of
manslaughter, but later exonerated by newly discovered evidence. 121 He
then sued the doctor who provided the expert testimony on which the
original conviction was based. 2 2 The court held that the doctor was enti-
tled to absolute witness immunity for his trial testimony, but not for his
nontestimonial actions in gathering and interpreting evidence in the
course of performing a medical examination. 23 The court held that this
conduct was more closely analogous to that of a police officer in investi-
gating a crime and was therefore subject to qualified immunity. 124 In my
view, this analysis correctly follows the Supreme Court's functional ap-
proach to absolute immunity by distinguishing the judicial function from
investigative and testimonial functions. Unfortunately, it has not been
adopted by any of the circuit courts addressing the issue.
In short, medical experts are not entitled to absolute judicial immunity
because they do not perform a judicial function, do not engage in judicial
acts, and are not subject to the procedural safeguards of the judicial pro-
cess. The functions they perform as investigators and witnesses entitle
them to qualified immunity only, except for their sworn testimony in the
appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not
the other."').
117. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983) ("In short, the rationale of our prior
absolute immunity cases governs the disposition of this case. In 1871, common-law immu-
nity for witnesses was well settled. The principles set forth in Pierson v. Ray to protectjudges and in Imbler v. Pachtman to protect prosecutors also apply to witnesses, who per-
form a somewhat different function in the trial process but whose participation in bringing
the litigation to a just-or possibly unjust-conclusion is equally indispensable.").
118. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127-31 (1997) (refusing to apply absolute immu-
nity where a prosecutor executed an affidavit under oath to obtain an arrest warrant);
Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41 (holding that a police officer who served as the complaining
witness to procure an arrest warrant was not entitled to absolute witness immunity);
Brisco, 460 U.S. at 342 ("A police officer on the witness stand performs the same function
as any other witness; he is subject to compulsory process, takes an oath, responds to ques-
tions of direct examination and cross examination, and may be prosecuted subsequently
for perjury.")
119. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 207-08 (1985) (refusing to grant prison-
discipline committee members absolute immunity because of the lack of procedural safe-
guards); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516 (1978) (granting administrative-law judges
absolute immunity because the procedural safeguards were comparable to those of the
judicial process).
120. No. 99-3019, 2000 WL 863133, at *7 (E.D. La. June 26, 2000).
121. Id. at *1.
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id. at *6; see Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that witness immunity does not shield non-testimonial acts like fabricating evidence).
124. Metoyer, 2000 WL 863133, at *7.
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judicial phase of the proceeding where they are entitled to absolute wit-
ness immunity.
2. Child-Protective Workers
While some circuit splits have developed on the issue, many circuits
extend absolute judicial immunity to child-protective workers including
guardians ad litem (GALs) 125 and social workers. For the six circuits
with published decisions, the courts have unanimously held that GALs
are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for activities within the scope of
their appointment.1 26 Specifically, the First,1 27 Third,128 Fourth,12 9
125. A GAL is "appointed to represent an infant... [and] is regarded as an officer or
agent of the court .... He or she is charged with the duty of protecting the rights and best
interest of the infant, and, when appropriate, making recommendations to the court on the
minor's behalf." 42 AM. JUR. 2d Infants § 183 (2003), quoted in Inga Larent, Note, "This
One's for the Children:" The Time Has Come to Hold GALs Responsible for Negligent
Injury and Death to their Charges, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 655, 656 n.2 (2004-05).
126. See infra notes 127-32.
127. Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying absolute immunity
in a case involving a sexual abuse investigation and stating, "[w]e conclude that the infor-
mation gathering, reporting, and recommending tasks ... are similar in nature and purpose
to those of a guardian ad litem and qualify to confer absolute quasi-judicial immunity.");
Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[Absolute] immunity applies no matter
how erroneous the act may have been, how injurious its consequences, how informal the
proceeding, or how malicious the motive."); see also Marr v. Me. Dept. of Human Services,
215 F. Supp. 2d 261, 269 (D. Me. 2002) (extending quasi-judicial absolute immunity to
GAL stating, "[The GAL's] duties included meeting with the child, investigating, and re-
porting to the court the best interests of the child. In performing these duties, [the GAL]
carried out a function that was integral to the judicial process." However, "A guardian ad
litem acting outside the scope of his/her authorized duties is not protected by quasi-judicial
immunity for those acts."); Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 167 F. Supp. 2d 399, 404 (D. Me. 2001)
(granting absolute quasi-judicial immunity to a GAL who "willfully or recklessly caused
harm to... children by failing to perform her statutory duties"); Snyder v. Talbot, 836 F.
Supp. 19, 21 (D. Me. 1993) (applying absolute immunity to GAL); Archambault Through
Archambault v. Printzlau, No. 87-1384-MC, 1990 WL 117906, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 1990)
("[G]uardian ad litem is a quasi-judicial official and entitled to absolute immunity for ac-
tions within the scope of the appointment."); Sarkisian v. Benjamin, 820 N.E.2d 263, 266
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (granting absolute immunity from claims arising from reports filed
by attorney. "Because all of the child's claims for damages arise out of duties performed by
[the court-appointed attorney acting] as a guardian ad litem or in a quasi judicial capacity,
we conclude that she is entitled to absolute immunity from the child's damages claims.");
Vondra v. Crown Pub. Co., No. 012199F, 2002 WL 31379948, at *5 (Mass. Super. Sept. 12,
2002) (applying absolute judicial immunity to a GAL); Mclarnon v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., No.
002910C, 2001 WL 1772034, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2001) (applying absolute judi-
cial immunity to GAL).
128. Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126-28 (3d Cir. 2001) (using a "functional ap-
proach," a court-appointed child-custody evaluator was found to have acted as "the arms
of the court" similar to a court-appointed psychologist (or similar to a GAL) and, thus,
entitled to judicial immunity. Furthermore, the custody evaluator appointed an unlicensed
psychologist. The court also granted judicial immunity to both the unlicensed psychologist
and the licensed psychologist overseeing her.); Gardner by Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d
131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying absolute immunity to functions of a GAL).
129. Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a GAL enjoys
absolute immunity); see also Lewittes v. Lobis, No. 04 Civ.0155 JSR AJP, 2004 WL
1854082, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2004) (holding that a GAL receives absolute immu-
nity); Gutman v. Crawford, No. 2:02CV388, 2002 WL 32589033, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 1,
2002) (holding that a GAL receives absolute immunity); Dalenko v. Wake County Dept. of
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Sixth, 130 Seventh,131 and Ninth Circuits 132 have all reached this conclu-
sion. In addition, district-court decisions and state-court decisions in the
Second, 133 Fifth,134 Eighth,135 Tenth,136 Eleventh, 137 and District of Co-
lumbia138 circuits are in accord. The circuits are split, however, on the
question of the applicable immunity for social workers in a child abuse
Human Services, 578 S.W.2d 599, 604 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Falk v. Sadler, 533 S.E.2d 350,
353 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a GAL receives absolute judicial immunity).
130. Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that a GAL re-
ceives absolute judicial immunity).
131. Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 157 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a GAL receives
absolute judicial immunity).
132. Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a GAL was
entitled to absolute immunity); see also Ward v. San Diego County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 691
F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D. Cal. 1988) ("[GAL] is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity
for her actions as guardian ad litem."); Widoff v. Wiens, 45 P.3d 1232, 1235 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2002) ("[GAL is] entitled to judicial immunity."); West v. Osborne, 34 P.3d 816, 821
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("[GAL] was acting as an arm of the court at all times. Accord-
ingly, she is entitled to [quasi-judicial] immunity.").
133. Lewittes v. Lobis, 2004 WL 1854082, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a GAL
was entitled to "quasi-judicial immunity"); Janicki v. Subbloie, No. CV0102778485, 2002
WL 819100, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2002); Bluntt v. O'Connor, 737 N.Y.S.2d 471,
478 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (accord); Bradt v. White, 740 N.Y.S.2d 777, 778-79 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2002) (accord).
134. Delcourt v. Silverman, 919 S.W. 2d 777, 781 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1996, writ denied) ("When judges delegate their authority or appoint others to perform
services for the court, the judicial immunity that attaches to the judge may follow the dele-
gation or appointment.").
135. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466-67 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Nonjudicial persons who
fulfill quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the judicial process have absolute im-
munity for damage claims arising from their performance of the delegated functions."
(court-appointed therapist)); Kent v. Todd County, No. Civ. 99-44 JRT RLE, 2001 WL
228433, at *7 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2001) ("[C]ourt-appointed GALs and custody evaluators
are among those quasi-judicial officers who qualify for absolute quasi-judicial immunity.");
Pirila v. Jantzen, No. A03-149, 2003 WL 22136802, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2003)
("Because appellant has not alleged that the respondents exceeded their authority as
guardians ad litem, they are entitled to absolute immunity."); Tindell v. Rogosheske, 421
N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("Although absolute immunity may occasionally
cause hardship, guardians ad litem must be protected against civil litigation challenging the
performance of their duties."); State ex rel. Bird v. Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 376, 385-86 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding quasi-judicial immunity extends to statutorily mandated guardians
ad litem in child-custody proceedings as to conduct within scope of guardian's duties).
136. Short by Oosterhous v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990) ("[A] court
appointed guardian ad litem in service of the public interest in the welfare of children is
squarely within the judicial process. Acting as such, a court appointed guardian ad litem is
thus entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity."); Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 806
P.2d 40, 47 (N.M. 1991) ("[If GAL] did carry out his responsibilities as an 'arm of the
court,' assisting the court in determining the reasonableness of the settlement reached by
Perrine and the attorneys for the Hospital defendants, [GAL] is absolutely immune from
liability for the negligence which the jury found.").
137. Dolin ex rel. N.D. v. West, 22 F. Supp.2d 1343, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 1998) ("Absolute
immunitv orotects witnesses, court appointed psychologists, and guardians ad litem who
are sued in their individual capacities under § 1983.").
138. Ficken v. Golden, No. Civ.A. 04-0350 (RMU), 2005 WL 692019, at *6 (D.D.C.
Mar. 24, 2005) ("The complaint fails to set forth allegations of Abod's actions beyond the
scope of his court-appointed role. Accordingly, the court concludes that Abod functioned
as an agent of the Superior Court and therefore is immune from suit."); Arntz v. Smith,
Nos. 94-7049, 94-7050, 1994 WL 474998, at *1 ( D.C. Cir. July 1, 1994) ("[T]he court-
appointed conservator... and guardian of Mary Arntz... is immune from suit for dam-
ages resulting from her quasi-judicial activities."); see also George S. Mahaffey, Jr., Role
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and a child custody cases. 139 A number of circuits have extended them
absolute immunity derived from absolute judicial immunity or absolute
prosecutorial immunity.140 Other circuits have concluded that social
workers should receive qualified immunity.141 As the following discus-
sion explains, these child-protective workers cannot establish an 1871
common-law counterpart to support the application of absolute judicial
immunity because they do not perform the required decision-making
function. Moreover, except for in-court testimony where witness immu-
nity applies, their activities are not governed by procedural protections
comparable to those of the judicial process. For these reasons, they are
not entitled to the protection of absolute judicial immunity.
a. Guardians ad Litem
Turning first to the cases involving GALs, the courts have almost
achieved unanimity in concluding that GALs should enjoy absolute judi-
cial immunity. 142 The courts have reasoned that the GALs function as
arms of the court in performing a function that is integral to the judicial
Duality and the Issue of Immunity for the Guardian Ad Litem in the District of Columbia, 4
J. L. & FAM. STUD. 279 (2002).
139. The area is complicated by the fact that social workers perform several distinct
functions. For purposes of this article, it is not necessary to address cases where social
workers perform functions wholly unconnected to a judicial proceeding. Thus, for exam-
ple, this discussion will not include cases where the social workers conduct investigations
and take children into custody before legal proceedings begin. See, e.g., Roe v. Tex. Dep't
of Prot. and Regulatory Serv., 299 F.3d 395, 400 (5th Cir. 2002); Hatch v. Dep't for Chil-
dren, 274 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2001); Millspaugh v. County Dep't. of Pub. Welfare of Wa-
bash County, 937 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991); Whisman ex rel. Whisman v. Rinehart,
119 F.3d 1303, 1309 (8th Cir. 1997). Another line of cases involves social workers who are
executing court orders for the removal of children. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Dep't of Soc.
Services, 884 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1989); LaPlaca v. Johnson, No. 87 C 20479, 1990 WL
304323, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21,1990). These cases are also beyond the scope of this
article.
140. See, e.g., Vosburg, 884 F.2d at 135 (holding that social workers are entitled to abso-
lute immunity based on their performance as the prosecutorial function); Hughes v. Long,
242 F.3d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that social workers enjoyed absolute judicial
immunity).
141. Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992) (granting qualified immunity to
social workers who conducted investigation or counseling with respect to child-abuse alle-
gations); Millspaugh v. County Dept. of Public Welfare of Wabash County, 937 F.2d 1172,
1176 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Social workers must settle for qualified immunity when taking initial
custody of children."); Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1383 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[So-
cial workers'] nontestimonial actions ... [are] not integral to the judicial process and there-
fore not entitled to absolute immunity.").
142. See supra notes 127-32. Our research found one Texas appellate-court case refus-
ing to apply absolute immunity to a GAL. Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 708 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) ("If we cloak the guardian ad litem with judicial immunity,
the minor has no recourse for an inadequate representation of her interests. The system's
attempt to maintain the finality of judgments and protect the minor from the next friend's
adverse interests would deny the minor any protection against acts of incompetence or bad
faith committed by her guardian ad litem. Consequently, we conclude that policy requires
this Court to hold the guardian ad litem accountable to the minor."). A New Mexico case
held that a GAL was entitled to absolute immunity for conducting an investigation pursu-
ant to a court order, but not for acting as the child's advocate. Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d
40, 50 (N.M. 1991). See Larent, supra note 125.
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process. 143 They often describe this as a "quasi-judicial function. 144
Courts have also found that public policy supports the application of ab-
solute immunity in order to ensure that GALs function without fear of
subsequent litigation.145
But in reaching this conclusion, the courts have failed to consider
whether the GALs satisfy the two requirements for applying absolute ju-
dicial immunity: (1) the performance of judicial acts in the discharge of
the judicial function; (2) the presence of procedural protections compara-
ble to those of judicial proceedings. In fact, neither requirement is met.
First, GALs do not perform judicial acts. GALs are not decision-makers
who resolve disputes, issue orders, or enter judgments. As in the case of
court-appointed medical experts, conducting an investigation and report-
ing the results to a court are not judicial acts.146 GALs do perform a
different function than medical experts when they are furthering the best
interests of the child. 147 However, representing a party's best interest in
court is more analogous to an advocacy function than a judicial func-
tion. 148 It would violate the rules of judicial conduct for a judge to re-
present the best interests of one of the parties in court.
Second, many of the GAL's activities are not subject to the protections
of the judicial process. Again, as in the case of medical experts, GALs
would enjoy absolute witness immunity to the extent they are testifying
under oath in the judicial phase of the proceeding. 149 Nevertheless, in
conducting their out-of-court investigations and preparing their reports
and recommendations, they are not subject to the constraints of the judi-
cial process and therefore are not entitled to the protection of absolute
judicial immunity.
b. Social Workers
In contrast to the federal court unanimity in GAL cases, the circuits
have taken different approaches to analyzing the applicable immunity for
social workers in child-abuse and custody cases. A number of circuits
have held that social workers perform the function of prosecutors in initi-
143. Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126-28 (3d Cir. 2001); Gardner ex rel. Gardner v.
Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.
1984).
144. See Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 2003).
145. Janicki v. Subbloie, No. CV0102778485, 2002 WL 819100, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 3, 2002).
146. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
147. See Marr v. Me. Dept. of Human Serv., 215 F. Supp. 2d 261, 269 (D. Me. 2002);
Leary v. Leary, 627 A.2d 30, 36-37 (Md. 1993); Bradt v. White, 740 N.Y.S. 2d 777, 779
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
148. See Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 48 (N.M. 1991) ("Where the guardian ad litem is
acting as an advocate for his client's position-representing the pecuniary interest of the
child instead of looking into the fairness of the settlement (for the child) on behalf of the
court-the basic reason for conferring quasi-judicial immunity on the guardian does not
exist. In that situation, he or she functions in the same way as does any other attorney for a
client-advancing the interests of the client, not discharging (or assisting in the discharge
of) the duties of the court.").
149. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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ating and pursuing child-protective proceedings and therefore enjoy ab-
solute prosecutorial immunity for those activities.' 50 Other cases have
extended absolute judicial immunity to social workers.'15 As the follow-
ing discussion shows, there is no historical basis for extending absolute
judicial immunity to social workers. Under the Court's historical and
functional approach to the immunity doctrine, qualified immunity is the
appropriate defense except when social workers are testifying in the judi-
cial phase of the proceedings when they enjoy absolute witness immunity.
By analogy to prosecutorial and judicial functions, the lower courts
have granted social workers absolute immunity for many functions. Spe-
cifically, the Third Circuit held that where a social worker acted as an arm
of the court in evaluating a child-custody case, the social worker was enti-
tled to absolute judicial immunity. 152 And where a social worker initiated
child dependency proceedings, she performed a prosecutorial function
and therefore enjoyed absolute prosecutorial immunity.153 Under this
150. See e.g., Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 825-26 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding social work-
ers enjoyed absolute immunity for initiating and pursuing dependency proceedings); Hollo-
way v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 775 (6th Cir. 2000) ("By analogy [to prosecutors], social
workers are absolutely immune only when they are acting in their capacity as legal advo-
cates-initiating court actions or testifying under oath-not when they are performing ad-
ministrative, investigative, or other functions."); Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d
368, 376 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding social workers enjoyed absolute immunity when per-
forming the prosecutorial function); Millspaugh v. Co. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 937 F.2d
1172, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding social workers enjoyed absolute immunity when
performing prosecutorial function); accord Vosburg v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133,
135 (4th Cir. 1989).
Interestingly, the cases define the scope of the prosecutorial function differently. In Doe,
the court included the investigation in connection with initiating a proceeding as a
prosecutorial function, while Holloway held that investigative activities should be distin-
guished from the prosecutorial function. Moreover, Vosburg included initiating the pro-
ceeding as a prosecutorial function, but Millsbaugh analogized seeking an initial order to a
police function. While the issue of prosecutorial immunity is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, I have previously argued that prosecutorial immunity should be entirely replaced by a
qualified immunity regime. See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial
Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 56 (2005).
151. Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (evaluating the immunity of
social workers and concluding "that the information gathering, reporting, and recom-
mending tasks of both are similar in nature and purpose to those of a guardian ad litem
and qualify to confer absolute quasi-judicial immunity"); Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121,
126-28 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding social workers enjoyed absolute judicial immunity for cus-
tody evaluations).
152. Hughes, 242 F.3d at 128; accord Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir.
2003) ("We conclude that the information gathering, reporting, and recommending tasks
... are similar in nature and purpose to those of a guardian ad litem and qualify to confer
absolute quasi-judicial immunity."); Rippy ex rel. Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 422
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding social workers entitled to absolute judicial immunity when failing
to ensure children were appointed guardians ad litem); Richmond v. Catholic Soc. Serv.,
No. 246833, 2004 WL 1416266, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. June 24, 2004) ("[Absolute quasi-
judicial] immunity extends to social workers in regard to activities involving the initiating
and monitoring of child placement proceedings and to placement recommendations in
cases where there is close oversight of the recommendations by the court.") (emphasis
added).
153. Miller, 174 F.3d at 376 (holding social workers are entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity for initiating child dependency proceedings); accord Ernst v. Child
and Youth Servs. of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 493 (3d Cir. 1997); Salyer v. Patrick, 874
F.2d 374, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding social workers function as quasi-prosecutors and
2006]
SMU LAW REVIEW
approach, social workers enjoy absolute immunity for many of their
functions.
For example, in Hughes v. Long, the Third Circuit considered which
immunity to apply in a bitter child-custody proceeding where the trial
court ordered a clinical social worker to conduct a full custody evaluation
and to report the results of psychological evaluations to the court.' 54 The
social worker interviewed the family, administered parenting tests, ar-
ranged for psychological testing, and made recommendations to the court
regarding custody arrangements. 155 According to the complaint, the so-
cial worker falsified results of the evaluation, omitted positive informa-
tion from the report, withheld data from another consulting psychologist,
and lied during custody proceedings. 156 The trial court granted the social
worker prosecutorial immunity or, alternatively, witness immunity.' 57
The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment, but on the basis of absolute
judicial immunity. 158 According to the court, judicial immunity, "has
given functionaries in the judicial system the ability to perform their tasks
and apply their discretion without the threat of retaliatory § 1983 litiga-
tion."'1 59 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on cases extending
judicial immunity to guardians ad litem as well as court-appointed doc-
tors and psychologists who function as "arms of the court. ' 160 In the
court's view, since the social worker's service was integral and essential to
the judicial process, the workers acted as "arms of the court" and were
entitled to judicial immunity.' 61
In my opinion, this analysis overlooks the Supreme Court's approach
to the immunity doctrines. While the Supreme Court has not addressed
the immunity defense available to social workers, Justice Thomas, in an
opinion dissenting from the denial of a petition for certiorari, stressed the
need to evaluate social worker immunity in historical context.' 62 The
case at issue extended absolute immunity to social-workers "'due to their
quasi-prosecutorial function.'"163 As Justice Thomas explained:
thus enjoy absolute immunity); Milspaugh v. County Dept. of Pub. Welfare of Wabash
County, 937 F.2d 1172, 1175 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding absolute immunity applied to a social
worker who initiated proceedings); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1452 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding social workers' initiation of proceedings was analogous to prosecutorial function);
see Johns, supra note 150 (arguing that the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity
should be reconsidered and replaced by a qualified-immunity regime); see also Sevier v.
Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that initiating proceeding is not a judicial
act). But see Howell v. Hofbauer, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (initiating
contempt proceedings held to be judicial act).
154. Hughes, 242 F.3d at 123.
155. Id. at 126.
156. Id. at 123.
157. Id. at 124.
158. Id. at 126.
159. Id. at 125.
160. Id. at 126.
161. Id. at 126-27.
162. Hoffman v. Harris, No. 92-6161, 1993 WL 369140, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 1993),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1060, 1062-63 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.).
163. Id.
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The courts that have accorded absolute immunity to social workers appear
to have overlooked the necessary historical inquiry; none has seriously con-
sidered whether social workers enjoyed absolute immunity for their official
duties in 1871. If they did not, absolute immunity is unavailable to social
workers under § 1983. This assumes, of course, that "social workers" (at
least as we now understand the term) even existed in 1871. If that assump-
tion is false, the argument for granting absolute immunity becomes (at least)
more difficult to maintain. 164
Even if the historical concerns could be overcome, Justice Thomas was
skeptical of the analogy to the prosecutorial function. In his view, social
workers, who participate in civil family law proceedings, were not necessarily
entitled to prosecutorial immunity since that doctrine is limited to "those
functions 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal pro-
cess.' 165 As he concluded, "We should address the important threshold
question whether social workers are, under any circumstances, entitled to
absolute immunity." 1
66
Even assuming these concerns could be overcome, the argument that so-
cial workers are entitled to absolute judicial immunity must fail. Like medi-
cal experts and GALs, social workers cannot satisfy the two requirements for
judicial immunity, the performance of judicial acts in the discharge of the
judicial function and the presence of procedural safeguards comparable tojudicial proceedings. Social workers do not perform judicial acts in the dis-
charge of a judicial function. 16 7 For example, in Hughes, the case workers
were not responsible for resolving disputes or adjudicating private rights, the
touchstone for finding the conduct to be a judicial function.' 68 Rather, their
job included interviewing witnesses, administering parenting tests, con-
ducting psychological examinations, and preparing expert reports.169 These
tasks are not judicial acts since they are not activities normally performed by
a judge within the judicial function and expectation of the parties.170 They
are investigative functions that receive qualified, not absolute, immunity.17 1
Indeed, if a judge were to conduct such an ex parte investigation or proffer an
expert opinion in court, those acts would constitute judicial misconduct. 172
Moreover, these out-of-court activities are not subject to the procedural con-
straints of the judicial process. While the social worker's sworn in-court testi-
mony is entitled to witness immunity, 173 this immunity would not extend to
non-testamentary, out-of-court misconduct, nor to unsworn statements that
are not governed by the rules of evidence nor subject to cross examination.
164. Id. at 1062.
165. Id. at 1063 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (emphasis pro-
vided by Justice Thomas)).
166. Hoffman, 511 U.S. 1060, 1063 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167. Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126-28 (3d Cir. 2001); see Tammy Lander, supra
note 86, at 919-20 (arguing that the Hughes decision correctly extends judicial immunity to
court-appointed mental-health professionals).
168. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993).
169. Hughes, 242 F.3d at 126.
170. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1978).
171. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993).
172. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. In fact, where a judge conducted a
private interview with a child in a custody matter over a parent's objection, the Wyoming
Supreme Court concluded that her due-process rights were violated. KES v. CAT, 107
P.3d 779, 786 (Wyo. 2005). As the court explained, "When a judge interviews a child with-
out the consent of a parent, that parent is deprived of due process inasmuch as he or she is
unable to hear the evidence, and is not given a opportunity to explain or rebut statements
made by the child." Id. at 784. If the judge could not constitutionally perform this investi-
gation, it defies logic to conclude that a social worker is performing a judicial act when she
does so.
173. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying witness immunity to a
psychologist); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (granting witness
immunity to a psychologist and psychiatrist).
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In short, child-protective workers do not qualify for absolute judicial im-
munity. There is no historical counterpart in the common law of 1871 to
justify the expansion of judicial immunity to the child-protective function.
Moreover, child-protective workers do not perform the core judicial function
of resolving disputes between parties within a procedural framework compa-
rable to that of the judicial process. For these reasons, they fail to overcome
the presumption that qualified immunity applies.
3. Receivers
A number of lower courts have concluded that absolute judicial immu-
nity applies to court-appointed receivers in §1983 cases. 174 But they have
failed to analyze whether the receivers performed a judicial act subject to
the protections of the judicial process. This analysis reveals that receivers
do not qualify for absolute immunity. Receivers typically investigate
property ownership, run businesses and agencies, and sell assets. 175 None
of these activities are normally performed by judges within the expecta-
tions of the parties; and none are constrained by the protections of the
judicial process. Some examples illustrate why judicial immunity should
not be extended to court-appointed receivers.
A Fifth Circuit decision provides a striking example of the erroneous
extension of judicial immunity to receivers. 176 In Bayless, a doctor found
liable in a malpractice action failed to pay the judgment. 177 The court
appointed a receiver to seize assets to satisfy the judgment.178 Allegedly
acting as the agent for the receiver, the attorney for the judgment-credi-
tor searched the home of the doctor's girlfriend and her daughter, rifled
through her underwear, and read her personal mail. 179 He left the home
with several pairs of her underwear. 180 The receiver and attorney also
searched the girlfriend's leased storage unit, seizing her family jewelry
and an oil painting. 81 The receiver and lawyer contended that the
searches and seizures were authorized by the receiver's appointment to
take possession of non-exempt property and by court's orders authorizing
174. New Ala. Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1989); Moses v.
Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 1987); Property Mgmt. & Inv., Inc. v. Lewis, 752
F.2d 599, 602-03 (11th Cir. 1985); Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1981);
Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980); T & W Inv. Co. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d
801, 802 (10th Cir. 1978); Kermit Contr. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1,
2-3 (1st Cir. 1976); Bradford Audio Corp. v. Pious, 392 F.2d 67, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1968); see
also Huszar v. Zeleny, 269 F. Supp. 2d 98 (E.D. N.Y. 2003); Murray v. Gilmore, 226 F.
Supp. 2d 179, 185-86 (2002); Walker Mgmt., Inc. v. Affordable Communities of Mo., 912 F.
Supp. 455 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Brown v. Costello, 905 F. Supp. 65, affd, 101 F.3d 685
(N.D.N.Y. 1995).
175. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DIC-TIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 739 (2d ed. 1995)
(defining a receiver as "'a person appointed by a court ... for the protection or collection
of property.' Usually, the receiver administers the property of a bankrupt, or property that
is the subject of litigation, pending the outcome of a lawsuit.").
176. Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1995).
177. Id. at 371.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 371-72.
180. Id. at 372.
181. Id.
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the searches. 182 These women were not parties in the receivership pro-
ceeding and received no notice that an order allowing the search of their
property had been issued. 183
The court held that the receiver, but not the attorney, was entitled to
absolute immunity derived from the appointing court's judicial immu-
nity.184 The court found that since the court appointing the receiver and
authorizing the search did not act in the "clear absence of all jurisdic-
tion," absolute judicial immunity applied. 185 Because of this, the receiver
who was acting under the court's authority was entitled to derivative im-
munity.186 But it denied this derivative immunity to the creditor's attor-
ney who acted as a private party seeking to satisfy her client's
judgment. 187
In extending immunity to the receiver, the court disregarded the func-
tional approach to judicial immunity that requires a judicial act subject to
procedural protections. Rather, the court held that so long as the judge
who appointed the receiver enjoyed judicial immunity, the receiver did as
well.188 But this conclusion ignores the distinct functions they performed.
Certainly searching private premises and confiscating personal property
are not acts normally performed by a judge, nor are such acts within the
expectation of the parties. The conduct does not involve the resolution of
disputes and the procedural safeguards of the courtroom are not present
at the plaintiff's storage locker and private home, where there is no judge,
no counsel, no record, and no appellate review.
Another example highlighting the over-expansive application of abso-
lute judicial immunity to receivers is Murray v. Gilmore.18 9 In response
to a lawsuit seeking improvements in public housing, the court appointed
a receiver to reorganize and restructure the public housing agency.' 90
The receiver's duties included establishing and implementing personnel
policies. 191 Plaintiff Murray, an employee of the agency, brought suit al-
leging civil-rights violations after being terminated by the receiver.192
The district court held that the receiver was absolutely immune in the
civil-rights action because he enjoyed absolute immunity as a judicial of-
ficer since he acted under the authority of the court order in implement-
182. Id. at 372, 374-75.
183. Id. at 372.
184. Id. at 373-75.
185. Id. at 374.
186. Id. at 373-74.
187. Id. at 374-75.
188. Actually, the court seems somewhat confused about the doctrine of absolute judi-
cial immunity in stating that receivers "share the appointing judge's absolute immunity
provided that the challenged actions are taken in good faith and within the scope of the
authority granted to the receiver." Id. at 373 (emphasis added). Absolute immunity is a
complete defense that precludes liability for actions taken in bad faith.
189. 231 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2002).
190. Id. at 84.
191. Id. at 84-85.




However, the court's analysis is erroneous because it fails to confine
absolute judicial immunity to the judicial function of resolving disputes
between parties. Running a housing authority-whether pursuant to a
court order or not-is simply not something a judge normally does within
the expectations of the parties. Indeed, even when a judge fires an em-
ployee, it is not a judicial act, but rather an administrative act protected
by qualified immunity, not absolute judicial immunity.194 In other words,
the Murray court expanded judicial immunity to protect the receiver for
an administrative act for which the judge himself would not have enjoyed
absolute judicial immunity.
Rather than extending absolute judicial immunity to court-appointed
receivers, the courts should follow the Supreme Court's admonition that
judicial immunity be limited to the core decision-making function. 195
Other functions, albeit essential to the administration of justice, enjoy
only qualified immunity.1 96 Perhaps the most apt example of this limiting
principle is Ex parte Virginia.197 In Ex parte Virginia, the Court consid-
ered whether a state-court judge enjoyed judicial immunity from criminal
liability for racial discrimination in jury selection in violation of a civil-
rights act passed shortly after the Civil War along with § 1983.198 The
judge claimed that jury selection was a judicial act and therefore he was
immune from liability. 199 Certainly, jury selection is integral to the judi-
cial process and essential to the administration of justice. But the Court
rejected this argument finding that jury selection was not a judicial act.200
As the Court explained, jury selection could be performed by a private
person as well as a judge.201 The Court drew the analogy to "a sheriff
holding an execution, in determining upon what piece of property he will
make a levy."' 20 2 This analogy is a close fit to the function of a court-
appointed receiver, charged with locating, managing, and selling assets.
These are administrative, not judicial functions, and therefore should en-
joy only qualified immunity.
4. Mediators
The District of Columbia Circuit extended absolute judicial immunity
to mediators and case evaluators when their services are performed in a
193. Id. at 88-89.
194. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 220-21 (1988); see also Meek v. County of River-
side, 183 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that judicial immunity does not apply to the
firing of subordinate judicial personnel).
195. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-37 (1993) (holding the
touchstone of the Judicial function is adjudicating private rights).
196. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229 (explaining that even essential administrative acts do not
enjoy absolute judicial immunity).
197. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
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court-sponsored program.20 3 The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclu-
sion for court-appointed, child-custody mediators. 20 4 Surprisingly, this is
one of the few extensions of judicial immunity to have received signifi-
cant scholarly comment.20 5 While some commentators favor absolute im-
munity for mediators and others favor liability, the arguments are
extensively developed and need not be repeated here. Rather than re-
weighing the pros and cons of mediator immunity, my point is simply that
mediators fail to meet the established requirements of the Court's func-
tional approach to judicial immunity in section 1983 actions.
To meet the burden of showing entitlement to absolute judicial immu-
nity, the defendant must establish that she performs judicial acts in the
discharge of the judicial function with adequate procedural safeguards. 2°6
The functions performed by mediators do not satisfy either requirement.
Mediation is the voluntary resolution of the dispute between parties with
the assistance of a mediator; which has no power to resolve the dispute.
As Professor Hughes explained, mediators do not perform the judicial
function because: "The mediator, in contrast to the arbitrator of judge,
has no power to impose an outcome on disputing parties. ' 20 7 In other
words, mediators do not perform the critical judicial function of "'resolv-
ing disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private
rights.' "208 o'
Moreover, since mediation is intentionally less formal and more flexi-
ble than the judicial process, it does not provide comparable procedural
protections. Specifically, in the typical mediation, the rules of evidence
do not apply, cross examination is not available, no formal record of the
203. Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (extending absolute quasi-
judicial immunity to mediators).
204. Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.
1987).
205. Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U.
CIN. L. REV. 731, 732-33 (1984); Arthur A. Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities of
Mediators: A Hostile Environment for Model Legislation, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
47, 52-53 (1986); Brian Dorini, Institutionalizing ADR: Wagshal v. Foster and Mediator
Immunity, 1 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 185, 186-87 (1996); Caroline Turner English, Stretching
the Doctrine of Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity: Wagshal v. Foster, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 759 (1995); Amanda K. Esquible, The Case of the Conflicted Mediator: An Argument
for Liability and Against Immunity, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 131, 148 (1999); Scott H. Hughes.
Mediator Immunity: The Misguided and Inequitable Shifting of Risk, 83 OR. L. REV. 107.
125-26 (2004); Cassondra E., Joseph, The Scope of Mediator Immunity: When Mediators
Can Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 629, 648-49 (1997);
Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147, 200 (2003); Joseph B. Stulberg,
Mediator Immunity, 2 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 85, 86 (1986); Kevin C. Gray, Com-
ment, Torts-Wagshal v. Foster: Mediators, Case Evaluators, and Other Neutrals-Should
They Be Absolutely Immune?, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1229, 1249-50 (1996).
206. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-436 (1993) (describing the
touchstone of the judicial function as adjudicating private rights); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193, 206 (1985) (refusing to extend absolute judicial immunity to a proceeding that
lacked procedural safeguards).
207. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DisPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIA-
TION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 123 (3d ed. 1999).
208. Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435-36.
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proceedings is maintained, and appellate review is not available. 20 9 In-
deed, the proceeding is confidential. 210 In contrast to judicial proceed-
ings that are open to public scrutiny and appellate review, mediation is a
secret process lacking formal procedural safeguards. 211
In short, mediators are not entitled to common-law absolute judicial
immunity because they do not perform judicial functions and because the
mediation process lacks the procedural protections of the judicial process,
including appellate review. While, as some commentators have argued
that policy reasons may support the adoption of mediator immunity, ap-
plication of judicial immunity to mediators was not present in the 1871
common law as required for immunity in § 1983 actions.212
5. Parole and Probation Officers
The Supreme Court has left open the question of which immunity de-
fense applies to parole and probations officers.213 In addressing this is-
sue, the lower courts have properly adopted a functional approach and
apply qualified immunity when the officer is performing law-enforcement
functions. 21 4 Unfortunately, some circuits have applied absolute immu-
nity to parole and probation officers when they investigate and prepare
presentencing reports. 215 As the following discussion will show, this ex-
tension of absolute judicial immunity is improper because the investiga-
tion afid preparation of presentence reports are not judicial acts
accompanied by procedural protections comparable to those of the judi-
cial process. Moreover, there is no historical common-law counterpart to
support this expansion of absolute judicial immunity.
Following the Supreme Court's functional approach to the immunity
defenses, the lower courts have properly held that many functions per-
formed by parole and probation officers are most analogous to police
209. See generally R. LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 356-
57 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining the informality and flexibility of the mediation process);
ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., LAWYERING-PRACTICE AND PLANNING 197-205 (1996)
(describing the mediation process).
210. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2005); Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidential-
ity, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60
LA. L. REV. 91, 94 (1999) (explaining the importance of confidentiality in mediation
proceedings).
211. HAYDOCK, supra note 209, at 192 ("The process and results of mediation are more
private and much less public than other forums, and parties who want matters to remain
confidential may prefer to mediate.").
212. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) ("We reemphasize that our role is to
interpret the intent of Congress in enacting §1983, not to make a free-wheeling policy
choice .... ).
213. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 n.11 (1980) ("We reserve the question of
what immunity, if any, a state parole officer has in a § 1983 action where a constitutional
violation is made out by the allegations.").
214. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1998); Jones v. Moore 986 F.2d 251,
253 (8th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Rhode Island, 815 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1987); Harper v. Jef-
fries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir. 1983);
Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270, 272 (6th Cir. 1982).
215. See infra notes 250-59.
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functions and are thus entitled to qualified immunity.216 For example, a
recent Ninth Circuit case, Swift v. California,217 carefully examined the
precise tasks the officers performed in determining whether absolute or
qualified immunity applied. Specifically, the plaintiff's section 1983 ac-
tion was based on: (1) the defendants' investigation of parole violation;
(2) the defendants' taking the parolee into custody and booking him into
a local jail; and (3) the defendants' recommendation that parole revoca-
tion proceedings be initiated.218 The court concluded that these functions
were most analogous to the law-enforcement functions of a police officer
investigating a crime, executing an arrest, and seeking an arrest war-
rant.21 9 The court distinguished cases where an official had the discretion
to actually initiate a proceedings, which is a prosecutorial function enti-
tled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. 220 But where the officer merely
recommends the initiation of proceedings to another official with the dis-
cretionary authority to actually initiate the proceedings, only qualified
immunity applies. 221
However, while many of the decisions involving probation and parole
officers properly apply qualified immunity because the officers perform
law -nforcement functions,222 another line of cases extends absolute judi-
cial immunity to officers for investigations and reports submitted in court
in connection with sentencing. The following discussion will briefly out-
line the presentence procedure and then address the erroneous applica-
tion of judicial immunity in these cases.
While there is some variation depending on the jurisdiction, many
states permit a presentence report to be submitted to the sentencing
judge and in some cases it is mandatory. 223 For example, under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1), "A probation officer shall make a
presentence investigation and report to the court before the imposition of
sentence unless the court finds that there is in the record information
sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing authority...
and the court explains this finding on the record. '224 The presentence
report typically presents a thorough history of the defendant including his
criminal record, financial condition, and relevant circumstances affecting
his behavior, as well as, an assessment of the financial, social, psychologi-
216. Scotto, 143 F.3d at 111; Jones, 986 F.2d at 253; Johnson, 815 F.2d at 8; Harper, 808
F.2d at 284; Galvan, 710 F.2d at 215; Wolfel, 691 F.2d at 272.
217. 384 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2004).
218. Id. at 1191-92.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1192-93; see Johns, supra note 150, at 154 (arguing that the doctrine of abso-
lute prosecutorial immunity should be reconsidered and replaced by a qualified immunity
regime).
221. Swift, 384 F.3d at 1191 (citing with approval Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
222. Id. at 1191 n.4 and cases cited therein.
223. CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 480 nn.62-65 (13th ed.
1992).
224. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1).
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cal, and mental impact of the crime on the victim. 2 25 The probation of-
ficer gathers this information from interviews with the defendant, the
defendant's criminal record, and from the defendant's family members,
employers, and victim. 226
Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, the rules of evidence
do not apply to the presentence report, and a wide range of information
may be considered. 227 Specifically, 18 U.S.C.A § 3661 provides:
No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an of-
fense which a court of the United State may receive and consider for
the purposed of imposing an appropriate sentence.228
Thus, neither the hearsay rule229 nor the exclusionary rule 230 apply in this
process. Indeed, many courts fail to screen the material for reliability and
simply presume hearsay to be reliable, requiring the defendant to prove
otherwise. 231 State provisions are similar. 232 Moreover, the defendant is
not entitled to cross examine the persons who made the statements in the
presentence report.233 While most states and the federal rules now re-
quire the disclosure of the report to the defendant and entitle the defen-
dant to object to unreliable information, in some jurisdictions disclosure
is left to the court's discretion.234 And while the defendant is not guaran-
teed the right to introduce evidence to rebut the presentence report, the
federal rules permit the courts to allow such evidence in their discre-
tion.2 35 In other words, the reports are essentially double hearsay-the
probation officer's out-of-court summary of a third-party's out-of-court
statement. The third party is neither under oath nor subject to cross-
examination when the interview is conducted; and the probation officer is
neither under oath nor subject to cross examination when she prepares
the report. In short, the presentence report is a collection of unsworn,
225. TORCIA, supra note 223, at 481-82 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(A), (D)).
226. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1116 (2d ed.
1992).
227. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949); LAFAVE, supra note 226, at 750-
57, 769.
228. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3662 (2005).
229. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 226, at 114.
230. Id. at 115.
231. Note, An Argument for Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1884 (1992).
232. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 226, at 114; see FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (providing
that the rules of evidence do not apply in sentencing).
233. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949); LAFAVE, supra note 226, at
114.
234. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 226 at 791-92; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e), (f).
Under the federal rule, the court may not disclose certain items of sensitive information,
but must summarize it and give the defendant an opportunity to object. FED. R. CRIM P.
32(d)(3) and (i).
235. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i). The Court has held that in capital cases due process re-
quires the defendant to have an opportunity to challenge the accuracy or materiality of
information relied on by the judge. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
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out-of-court, hearsay statements to a probation officer, not subject to the
rules of evidence and not subject to cross examination or even rebuttal.
Not surprisingly, presentence reports are often inaccurate. 236 They
omit information, contain wrong information, and are biased.237 There
are several reasons for this. First, the investigation does not begin until
after guilt has been established, and that may be long after the crime was
committed such that evidence has become stale and witnesses have van-
ished.2 38 In addition, the probation officer is required not just to report,
but also to interpret the facts that can lead to "a pro-state slant, a phe-
nomenon that has been reported often. '2 39 Moreover, in response to the
pressure of a large caseload, the officer may rely heavily on the prosecu-
tor's file. 240 As one commentator noted, "It is an unavoidable observa-
tion that the evaluative sections of the [presentence reports] frequently
appear for all the world as if they had been lifted from a prosecuting
attorney's sentencing argument."'24'
Because the probation officer functions as an investigator in preparing
the report and providing it to the court, the strongest analogy for immu-
nity purposes would be to a police officer who conducts an investigation
and prepares a report. As previously explained for medical experts and
child-protective workers, qualified immunity applies to this function.24 2
While the officer would be entitled to absolute witness immunity for testi-
mony under oath in the judicial phase of the proceeding, 243 unsworn
hearsay statements by third parties that are collected in the report do not
enjoy witness immunity.
This analysis was correctly followed in a recent Fourth Circuit case
where the court rejected a police officer's claim that he was entitled to
immunity for fabricating evidence in a police report that ultimately led to
the wrongful conviction of an innocent man for rape and murder.244 Af-
ter the defendant was exonerated by DNA evidence, he sued the police
officer for violating his civil rights.245 The court rejected the claim that
absolute immunity attached, distinguishing testimony at trial that enjoyed
witness immunity from the out-of-court preparation of the false report.246
The court held that qualified immunity was the appropriate defense for
this conduct, 247 but that it failed because falsifying evidence violated
236. Peter B. Pope, How Unreliable Factfinding Can Undermine Sentencing Guidelines,
95 YALE L. J. 1258, 1274-78 (1986).
237. Id. at 1275-76.
238. Id. at 1276.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1277.
241. Id. at 1276 n.89.
242. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); see supra notes 116-45 and ac-
companying text.
243. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983) (recognizing that witnesses enjoy
absolute immunity for testimony in the judicial phase of the proceedings).
244. Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2005).
245. Id. at 275, 277-78.
246. Id. at 282-83.
247. Id. at 281.
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clearly established law of which a reasonable officer would have
known. 248 Thus, the plaintiff's case was allowed to proceed to trial.2 49
This same analysis should be applied where a probation officer con-
ducts an investigation and prepares a false report. As the Supreme Court
has repeatedly admonished, where defendants perform the same func-
tion, they should receive the same immunity.250 For example, in Buckley
v. Fitzsimmons, the Court held that where the prosecutor performs the
function of an investigator, she enjoys qualified immunity like a police
officer, not absolute immunity as a prosecutor. 251 As Justice Kennedy
has explained, one of the Court's "unquestioned goals of.. . § 1983 juris-
prudence [is] ensuring parity in treatment among state actors engaged in
identical functions. ' 252 Thus, to achieve parity in treatment, probation
officers who conduct investigations and prepare reports in connection
with a criminal proceeding should receive the same protection that a po-
lice officer receives for performing these functions-qualified immunity.
Yet, several circuit courts have applied absolute "quasi-judicial" immu-
nity since the activity of preparing a presentence report is "intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. '253 Specifi-
cally, the Second,254 Fifth, 255 Ninth,256 Tenth,257 Eleventh,25 8 and D.C.
Circuits25 9 have granted officers absolute judicial immunity. A district
court in the First Circuit reached the same conclusion.2 60 But, as ex-
plained above, this conclusion cannot be justified under a functional anal-
ysis. Conducting investigations and preparing investigation reports are
not judicial acts subject to the protections of the judicial process; they are
248. Id. at 281-84.
249. Id. at 284.
250. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
251. Id. ("When a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed
by a detective or police officer, it is 'neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same
act, immunity should protect the one and not the other."' (quoting Hampton v. City of
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)).
252. Id. at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Imbler v.
Pachtman 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)).
254. Rolle v. Cassidy, 64 F. App'x 322 (2d Cir. 2003); Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133,
137 (2d Cir. 1987).
255. Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988); Spaulding, 599 F.2d at 729.
256. Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1984); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d
318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970); Desilva v. Baker, 96 P.3d 1084, 1089 (Ariz. 2004) (citing federal
cases in applying absolute judicial immunity to probation officers who filed a false
presentence report in a § 1983 action brought in state court).
257. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 687-88 (10th Cir. 1990); Tripati v. U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 784 F.2d 345, 347-48 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1028 (1988) (applying absolute immunity to pretrial services report); Hummell v. McCot-
ter, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1330 (D. Utah 1998) (holding absolute immunity applied to prepa-
ration of presentence report).
258. Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984).
259. Turner v. Barry, 856 F.2d 1539, 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
260. Namey v. Reilly, 926 F. Supp. 5, 9-10 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding that federal proba-
tion officer enjoyed absolute immunity for preparing sentencing materials since this was
"closely associated with the discretionary function of the decision-maker").
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investigative acts that enjoy only qualified immunity. 261 Moreover, ex-
tension of absolute immunity cannot be justified by history because the
very first paid probation officer in the United States was retained in 1878,
seven years after the adoption of § 1983.262
B. THE IMPROPER EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY TO
DECISION-MAKERS IN NON-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
LACKING PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
In another line of cases, since the early twentieth century, the lower
courts have frequently extended absolute immunity to defendants who
perform a function that is analogous to that of judges because they act as
decision-makers functioning outside of the judicial process. 26 3 In my
view, this expansion is unwarranted for two main reasons. First, this 20th
century expansion of immunity ignores the requirement that the absolute
immunity defense should be confined to its 1871 scope in § 1983 cases.
Second, in many cases, these decisions ignore the Supreme Court's ruling
in Cleavinger v. Saxner that the application of absolute judicial immunity
is limited to proceedings where the safeguards are comparable to those of
the judicial process. 264 This section will discuss this expansion of judicial
immunity outside of the judicial process in cases involving: (1) parole-
board members; (2) licensing-board members; and (3) land-use officials.
Before turning to the lower-court cases erroneously extending judicial
immunity outside of the judicial process, the Supreme Court's decisions
governing this issue will be briefly reviewed. The requirement of limiting
absolute judicial immunity to its 1871 boundaries has been explained
above and need not be repeated here. 265 However, a more detailed re-
view of the Court's decisions on procedural protections is necessary to
explain why these additional expansions of judicial immunity depart from
the Court's precedents.
Essentially, where proceedings have protections comparable to those
of the judicial process, absolute immunity applies to decision-makers per-
261. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1993).
262. R. HENNINGSEN, PROBATION AND PAROLE 14 (1981), quoted in Pope, supra note
236, at 1276 n.88.
263. Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The concept of abso-
lute immunity for non-court personnel exercising certain adjudicatory functions did not
arise, however, until the early twentieth century." (citing R. J. Gray, Private Wrongs of
Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303, 314 (1959) "Certain bodies who clearly do not fit
within the tradition judicial hierarchy have by analogy been given this [judicial] immunity.
They are usually statutorily created bodies with procedure comparable to courts, exercising
adjudicatory functions. So bankruptcy commissions, military tribunals, ecclesiastical
courts, lunacy hearings and many other boards of inquiry and commissions have been
equated to courts, for purposes of granting immunity."); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Gov-
ernments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963); Edward G. Jen-
nings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1937); Wayne
McCormack & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Immunities of State Officials Under Section 1983, 8
RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 65 (1976); John J. Grant, Note, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1513 (1978).
264. 474 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1985).
265. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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forming judicial acts;266 but where those safeguards are lacking, qualified
immunity applies.267 Specifically, in Butz v. Economou, the Court held
that administrative-law judges were entitled to absolute judicial immunity
because they performed the judicial function and the procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which were functions comparable to those
of the judicial process.268 The Supreme Court detailed the kinds of pro-
tections that justify absolute immunity, including: adversary proceed-
ings;269 a trier of fact insulated from political pressure; 270 the right to
present evidence; 271 a transcript of proceedings;272 and a statement of
findings and conclusions on all issues of fact, law or discretion.273
At the other end of the spectrum are proceedings lacking sufficient
safeguards to justify the application of absolute immunity. For example,
in Cleavinger v. Saxner, the Court rejected the argument that judicial im-
munity protected members of a federal prison's discipline committee.274
The committee heard cases in which inmates were charged with rules in-
fractions. 275 The inmates had the right to have a written copy of the
charge, have a member of the prison staff represent him, be present at the
hearing, call witnesses, submit documentary evidence, and receive a writ-
ten explanation of the committee's decision.276 Following the committee
decision, the inmates could appeal the decision to the warden of the insti-
tution and to the Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons.277
In rejecting the extension of judicial immunity, the Court acknowl-
edged that the committee members performed an adjudicatory function
by determining the inmate's guilt or innocence, hearing testimony, receiv-
ing documentary evidence, weighing credibility, and rendering a deci-
sion. 278 It also recognized that members could be subject to harassment
and intimidation by disappointed inmates.279 But the Court ultimately
rejected the extension of judicial immunity because the safeguards availa-
ble in a judicial proceeding were lacking in the prison's disciplinary pro-
cess. 280 Specifically, the members who were prison officials "temporarily
diverted from their usual duties"28 1 and were not independent like fed-
266. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978).
267. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203-04, 206 (1985).
268. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512-14.





274. 474 U.S. 193, 207-08 (1985). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White, dissented. In his view, the realities of the prison environment justified the
extension of absolute immunity to members of the Discipline Committee.
275. Id. at 194.
276. Id. at 195.
277. Id. at 197.
278. Id. at 203.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 203-04.
281. Id. at 204.
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eral or state judges and professional hearing officers. 282 They were the
direct subordinates of the warden, who reviewed their decisions, and
were sitting in judgment on a dispute between an inmate and a fellow co-
worker. 283
Moreover, the Court listed the procedural deficiencies:
The prisoner was to be afforded neither a lawyer nor an independent
nonstaff representative. There was no right to compel the attendance
of witnesses or to cross-examine. There was no right to discovery.
There was no cognizable burden of proof. No verbatim transcript
was afforded. Information presented often was hearsay or self-serv-
ing. The committee members were not truly independent. In sum,
the members had no identification with the judicial process of the
kind and depth that has occasioned absolute immunity.28 4
Within this framework, in determining whether to extend absolute judi-
cial immunity outside of the judicial process, the courts should carefully
evaluate whether the procedural protections at issue are comparable to
those of the judicial process, as in Butz, or to the prison disciplinary pro-
cess, as in Cleavinger. But this approach is itself problematic since there
is no clear rule about which procedures are required and which proce-
dures are merely optional. Since there is no established standard, each
procedural scheme must be separately evaluated, complicating the litiga-
tion and creating uncertainty. Further, as the following discussion shows,
at times the lower courts have skipped this inquiry altogether and ex-
tended absolute judicial immunity despite the lack of sufficient procedu-
ral protections. This discussion addresses the unwarranted expansion of
absolute immunity to: (1) parole-board members; (2) licensing-board
members; and (3) land-use officials.
1. Parole-Board Members
The Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of whether
absolute immunity extends to parole-board members. 285 The circuits
have unanimously concluded that it does, at least with respect to the per-
282. Id. at 203.
283. Id. at 204.
284. Id. at 206.
285. Id. at 204 (distinguishing members of a prison disciplinary committee, who re-
ceived only qualified immunity, from parole-board members).
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formance of adjudicatory duties. 286 The First, 287 Second, 288 Third, 289
286. They have split on the question whether absolute immunity also extends to execu-
tive or administrative functions. See, e.g., Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir.
1989); Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986); Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d
231, 237-40 (3d Cir. 1977); Friedland v. Fauver, 6 F. Supp. 2d 292, 304 (D.N.J. 1998); Hayes
v. Muller, No. 9603420, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14987, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1996).
287. Johnson v. R.I. Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[w]e join those
circuit courts which have addressed this issue and conclude that the defendant parole
board members are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages in a § 1983
action for actions taken within the proper scope of their official duties."); Nicolas v. Rhode
Island, 160 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232 (D.R.J. 2001) (extending absolute immunity to a parole-
board member).
288. Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999) ("What is more, parole board
officials, like judges, may find themselves spending an inordinate amount of time and ex-
pense defending against baseless suits brought by disappointed parolees, thereby distract-
ing parole board officials from their crucial duties in administering the state's penal system.
For these reasons, we join our sister circuits and hold directly that parole-board officials,
like judges, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages when they serve a
quasi-adjudicative function in deciding whether to grant, deny or revoke parole."); Scotto
v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing in dicta that parole board offi-
cials are absolutely immune from liability for damages when he decides to grant, deny, or
revoke parole, because this task is functionally comparable to that of a judge).
289. Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 236-40 (3d Cir. 1976) ("No doubt can be enter-
tained that probation officers and Pennsylvania Parole Board members are entitled to
Quasi-iudicial immunity when engaged in adjudicatory duties. This has bccn repeatedly
held by courts of appeal and district courts, though not by the Supreme Court, insofar as
we are aware .... "); Nellom v. Luber, No. 02-2190, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7103, at *21
(E.D. Pa. 2004) ("Plaintiff's challenge of the Parole Board Defendants' decisions denying
his re-parole in May 2000, June 2001, and June 2002, and his challenge of their stated
reasons for denying re-parole in June 2002, are attacks on adjudicatory decisions .... As
such, the Parole Board Defendants' decisions denying reparole, and their reasons support-
ing those decisions, are protected by absolute immunity, since these actions represent adju-
dicatory functions.").
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Fourth,290 Fifth,291 Sixth,292 Seventh, 29 3 Eighth, 294 Ninth,29 5 Tenth,296
290. Pope v. Chew, 521 F.2d 400, 405-06 (4th Cir. 1975) ("Parole board members have
been held to perform a quasi-judicial function in considering applications for parole and
thus to be immune from damages § 1983 actions."); Robinson v. Fahey, 366 F. Supp. 2d
368, 371 (E.D. Va. 2005) ("All of the defendants are members of the Virginia Board of
Parole who are being sued on account of decisions they made in determining whether
Robinson should be granted parole. Consequently, they are entitled to absolute immunity
291. Hulsey v. Owens, 63 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e have repeatedly held that
parole board members are absolutely immune when performing their adjudicative func-
tions, distinguishing such decision-making activities from administrative functions for
which parole board members are entitled to only qualified immunity."); Walter v. Torres,
917 F.2d 1379, 1385 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that parole-board members had absolute im-
munity for parole determinations); Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the history of absolute immunity for parole board members, equating their
function to that of judges and labeling the parole board's function "quasi-judicial"); Farrish
v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 836 F.2d 969, 973-74 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that parole officers
acting in an adjudicative capacity are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 damage
claims); Serio v. Members of La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding members of parole board absolutely immune for the denial of plaintiff's parole);
Cruz v. Skelton, 502 F.2d 1101, 1101-02 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that parole board members
are absolutely immune from suits for money damages for refusing to grant parole).
292. Horton v. Martin, No. 04-1142, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10855, at *4 (6th Cir. June
7, 2005) ("Parole board members are absolutely immune from liability for their conduct in
individual parole decisions when they are exercising their decision making powers."); Cole-
man v. Martin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 894, 903 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (holding parole board members
enjoy absolute immunity when performing adjudicatory functions); Bricker v. Mich. Parole
Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (concluding that "the decision to impose
certain conditions of parole fell within the quasi-judicial functions vested in the Parole
Board members by Michigan law" and therefore entitled the officials to immunity from
suit under § 1983).
293. Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1445 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The actions of the prisoner
board members in this case fall squarely within the class of conduct for which absolute
immunity is provided. The decision to revoke Wilson's supervised release, albeit on
grounds that Wilson argues were not valid, is a prototypical quasi-judicial act deserving of
absolute immunity."); Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277, 283 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that scheduling of parole revocation hearings was comparable to the function of a judge
setting a trial date and thus entitled the officer to absolute immunity); Trotter v. Klincar,
748 F.2d 1177, 1182 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying absolute immunity to the parole revocation
and decision process); United States ex rel. Powell v. Irving, 684 F.2d 494, 496-97 (7th Cir.
1982) (holding absolute immunity was necessary to protect parole-board members from
excessive litigation).
294. Antonn v. Getty, 78 F.3d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1996); Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999
F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding absolute immunity applies to decisions by parole
board to deny parole); Nelson v. Balazic, 802 F.2d 1077, 1078 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
parole board members are absolutely immune from suit when considering and deciding
parole questions); Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1985) (granting immunity to
parole officials performing official duties); Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 831 (8th Cir.
1983) (holding absolute immunity applies to decisions to grant, deny or revoke parole).
295. Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that parole
board members enjoy absolute immunity for decision to grant or deny parole); Anderson
v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1983); Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("[p]arole board officials perform functionally comparable tasks to judges when
they decide to grant, deny, or revoke parole. The daily task of both judges and parole
board officials is the adjudication of specific cases or controversies. Their duty is often the
same: to render impartial decisions in cases and controversies that excite strong feelings
because the litigant's liberty is at stake. They face the same risk of constant unfounded
suits by those disappointed by the parole board's decisions.").
296. Giese v. Scafe, 133 F. App'x 567, 569 (10th Cir. 2005) (granting members of parole
board absolute immunity for delaying plaintiff's release for fifteen months by imposing
SMU LAW REVIEW
and Eleventh 29 7 Circuits have granted absolute immunity to parole offi-
cials for all actions related to the processing of alleged parole violations.
District-court decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit also apply ab-
solute immunity to parole-board members.298 In my view, the extension
of judicial immunity to parole proceedings is erroneous for two reasons.
First, it violates the common-law understanding in 1871 that parole deci-
sions were protected by qualified, not absolute immunity. Second, it ig-
nores the lack of procedural safeguards in the parole process.
From a historical perspective, absolute immunity did not apply to pa-
role decisions in 1871 when § 1983 was adopted since parole boards did
not exist in 1871.299 Ohio was the first state to adopt a statewide system
of parole through an administrative agency in 1884.300 Before 1884,
elected officials made parole determinations. 30 1 California, one of the
first states to adopt a parole agency, did so primarily to relieve governors
of part of the burden of exercising clemency to reduce excessive and dis-
parate sentences.30 2 In 1871, these elected officials enjoyed qualified im-
munity.30 3 As the Ninth Circuit explained, since the Supreme Court has
held that the 1871 Congress intended to preserve the established com-
mon-law immunities, "[a]s successors to state governors in making parole
decisions, state parole board members should enjoy at least the same im-
munity enjoyed by governors and other state executives under the com-
mon law."'30 4 But the decision to grant immunity beyond that enjoyed in
1871 defies the Supreme Court's admonition that absolute immunity
under § 1983 is limited to those functions that enjoyed absolute immunity
in 1871.305
Second, parole-board members should not enjoy absolute immunity
because parole proceedings fail to meet the Butz requirement, which lim-
its the application of absolute judicial immunity to proceedings with pro-
cedural safeguards comparable to those of the judicial process. 30 6 The
conditions that could not be satisfied); Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1992);
Knoll v. Webster, 838 F.2d 450, 450 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying absolute judicial immunity to
parole-board members).
297. Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding parole-board
members enjoyed absolute quasi-judicial immunity for decisions to grant or deny parole).
298. Pate v. U.S., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding [Parole board official
was] "entitled to absolute immunity for her alleged failure to timely schedule [parolee's]
parole revocation hearing.").
299. Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Sheldon L. Messinger et al., The Foundations of Parole in California, 19 L. &
Soc'y REV. 69 (1985).
303. Sellars. 641 F.2d at 1302. Common-law qualified immunity existed where an offi-
cial acted in good faith and without malice. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245-47
(1974). Qualified immunity is now determined by an objective standard. Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
304. Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1302.
305. See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493-94 (1991) (stating that courts must look
to the functions that enjoyed absolute immunity under nineteenth-century American com-
mon law); see also supra note 31 and cases cited therein.
306. See supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
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arguments against the application of absolute immunity to parole-board
members were thoughtfully presented in a 1988 student note, A Board
Does Not a Bench Make: Denying Quasi-Judicial Immunity to Parole
Board Members in Section 1983 Damages Actions by Julio A. Thomp-
son.30 7 As Mr. Thompson points out, there is no uniform parole system
in this country. 30 But one consistent hallmark of parole boards is the
members' susceptibility to political pressure. 30 9 Members are typically
appointed by governors, subject to legislative approval. 310 In some states,
the governor has authority to overrule any parole-board decision to grant
parole.311 Thus, the decision-maker's insulation from the political pro-
cess, relied on in Butz to support the application of judicial immunity, 312
is entirely absent in the parole context.
Parole hearings are markedly different from judicial proceedings in
other respects as well. In contrast to criminal-court proceedings, parole
hearings are characterized by informality and brevity. 313 The rules of evi-
dence do not apply and a wide range of materials may be considered by
individual boards. 314 In Michigan, for example, the Parole Board adopts
the presentence report as true despite its hearsay character. 315 Inmates
are often not present, and when they are, their participation is limited.316
Only a few jurisdictions permit counsel to accompany the inmate.317
While some systems require a written record of the reasons for the parole
board's decision, judicial review is limited.318 In short, the procedural
protections supporting the extension of absolute immunity in Butz-the
right to present evidence,319 the application of the rules of evidence, 320 a
transcript of proceedings,321 a statement findings and conclusions on all
307. Julio A. Thompson, A Board Does Not a Bench Make: Denying Quasi-Judicial
Immunity to Parole Board Members in Section 1983 Damages Actions, 87 MICH. L. REV.
241 (1988).
308. Id. at 249.
309. Id. at 252, 257.
310. Id. at 252-53, 257.
311. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8 (granting the governor the power to review pa-
role decisions).
312. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
313. Thompson, supra note 307, at 250-51; see e.g., Christopher v. U.S. Bd. of Parole,
589 F.2d 924, 932 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e hold that [parolee] Christopher, by not being
entitled to call adverse witnesses and to cross-examine them, was not denied due process
on the facts of this particular case.").
314. Thompson, supra note 307, at 250-51; see e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998) (holding that the federal exclusionary rule does not bar the intro-
duction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees' U.S. Con-
stitution Fourth Amendment rights).
315. Stuart G. Friedman, Feature: Prisoners and Corrections: The Michigan Parole
Board: A Smoldering Volcano, 77 MICH. BAR J. 184, 187 (1998).
316. Thompson, supra note 307, at 251.
317. Id. at 251.
318. Id. at 251-52,
319. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978).
320. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 206 (1985) (criticizing the admission of
hearsay and self-serving evidence in pleadings).
321. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512-14.
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issues of fact, law or discretion,322 the right to agency or judicial re-
view,323 and adherence to precedent 324-are all absent in the typical pa-
role hearing.
An example illustrates the point. In California, over 24,000 prisoners
have been given indeterminate sentences-for example ten or fifteen
years to life.325 After serving the fixed portion of these sentences, these
prisoners were supposed to be able to establish that they had been reha-
bilitated and then be returned to society.326 The rules provide that these
prisoners have the right to notice of the hearing at least one month in
advance; the right to review nonconfidential documents and to file a re-
sponse; the right to be present, to speak, to ask and answer questions; the
right to be represented by an attorney; the right to receive a copy of the
decision; and the right to a copy of the transcript of the hearing. 327
But the hearing procedures are dramatically different from a court pro-
ceeding. Specifically, the victim must be notified of the hearing and has
the right to appear along with two family members or representatives to
"express their views."'328 They can also present written, audiotaped or
videotaped statements.329 A representative of the district attorney's of-
fice from the county of conviction must be invited to attend and partici-
pate in the hearing. 330 According to established procedure, "[t]he victim,
the victim's representative, or the prosecutor representing the views of
the victim and the victim's family has the right to speak last. '331
Other information-not necessarily satisfying the rules of evidence-
may also be presented, including sections of the trial transcript, police
reports, photographs, and autopsy protocols.332 After preliminary mat-
ters, the presiding commissioner recites the facts of the commitment of-
fense taken from the appellate decision if one is available, or the
probation report if one is not.333 This information is placed on the official
record.334 The panel also considers prior convictions and "reliably docu-
mented criminal behavior that did not result in a conviction. '335 The
panel then considers the prisoner's social history including family back-
ground, family relationships, education, military service, drug or alcohol
use, and psychological issues.336 The next stage of the hearing focuses on




325. Michael Goldberg, The Longest Wait, S.F. CHRON., July 1, 2005, at B8.
326. Id.
327. CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 1449 (CEB 2005).
328. Id. at 1450.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1454.
331. Id. at 1450.
332. Id. at 1454.
333. Id. at 1456.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1457.
336. Id. at 1457.
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tion and training, self help, and psychological reports.337 Finally, the
panel considers letters solicited from interested parties including the trial
judge, defense counsel, the prosecuting attorney, and the investigating
law-enforcement agency.338 Under California rules, the right to submit
opinions is granted to "any person interested in the grant or denial of
parole. ' '339
The panel then determines whether the prisoner is suitable for pa-
role. 3 40 In making this determination, the Board of Prison Terms has al-
most unlimited discretion, subject to very limited administrative and
judicial review. 341 The Board has been sparing in exercising its power to
release inmates with indeterminate sentences. 342 For example, in 2004
the Board held 2,713 suitability hearings, but rejected parole for 2,613
and recommended release for only 199.
34 3
When the commitment offense is murder, the governor may reverse or
modify any parole decision within thirty days after it becomes final.344 In
most cases, California governors have been unwilling to adopt the
Board's recommendations for inmate release. Since 1991, the Board of
Prison Terms has recommended the release of 838 inmates, but California
governors have released only 219.345 In his five years as governor, Gray
Davis released only six of the 368 prisoners recommended by the
Board. 346 As he once remarked, "the only way a convicted murderer
would leave prison would be in a pine box."
347
In short, as the California example illustrates, parole hearings consider
all kinds of information that is not subject to the rules of evidence, not
submitted under penalty of perjury, and not subject to cross-examination.
The right to appeal is extremely limited. Rather than operating indepen-
dently of the political process, the parole process is highly politicized. For
murder convictions, the governor has the absolute right to veto any board
determination. In other words, these proceedings lack most of the char-
acteristics of the administrative process in Butz that justified the applica-
tion of absolute judicial immunity.
2. Licensing-Board Members
The lack of adequate procedural safeguards is also an issue in cases
involving licensing-board members. A number of circuits have granted
absolute judicial immunity to licensing-board members on the grounds
that they act as decision-makers for the state and are subject to procedu-
337. Id. at 1457-58.
338. Id. at 1460.
339. Id. at 1460.




344. Id. at 1463.





ral safeguards. 348 But in some cases, the board proceedings lack the safe-
guards required by Butz and clearly fall on the Cleavenger end of the
procedural spectrum.
For example, in Dunham v. Wadley, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
members of the Arkansas Veterinary Medical Examining Board were en-
titled to absolute judicial immunity in a § 1983 action brought by a person
who was denied the right to practice veterinary medicine by the board.349
Under Arkansas law, graduates of foreign veterinary schools are entitled
to practice under the supervision of licensed veterinarians, for which the
plaintiff qualified.350 The board received information that the plaintiff
was practicing at two clinics without a licensed veterinarian on the site.351
The board "discussed Dr. Dunham's situation during two scheduled
meetings, maintained detailed minutes of each meeting, and considered
investigative reports that were prepared in her case."'352 Following the
meetings, the board sent Dr. Dunham and her two employers "cease and
desist" letters notifying them of their conclusion that Dr. Dunham was
practicing veterinary medicine without a proper license.353 The letters
ordered the employers to cease their employment of the plaintiff and
threatened criminal prosecution and adverse administrative action for
noncompliance.35 4 The board's letter invited the plaintiff to call the
board if she had any questions.355 As a result of these letters, the em-
348. Beck v. Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 204 F.3d 629, 636 (5th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing dental examiners were entitled to absolute immunity where they performed a judicial
function, were insulated from the political process, provided notice of the charges, permit-
ted the dentist to present evidence, allowed the dentist to be represented by counsel, and
provided for appellate review); Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
members of medical board were entitled to judicial immunity for their quasi-judicial acts
since the proceedings had sufficient procedural protections); Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d
1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding members of racing commission enjoyed absolute
immunity for disciplinary matters); see also O'Neal v. Miss. Bd. of Nursing, 113 F.3d 62, 66-
67 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that nursing regulatory board performed quasi-judicial function
and provided sufficient procedural protections to justify absolute immunity); Watts v.
Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269, 274 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding members of state medical-licensing
board were entitled to absolute immunity in connection with decisions to suspend or re-
voke a medical license, finding the procedural protections sufficient); Yoonessi v. Albany
Med. Ctr., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding members of California
Medical Board enjoyed absolute immunity); VanHorn v. Neb. State Racing Comm'n, 304
F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160 (D. Neb. 2004) (finding sufficient procedural safeguards in a disci-
plinary proceedings against a veterinarian where the commission maintained an official
record, followed the rules of evidence, administered oaths, issued subpoenas, permitted
cross examination, permitted the plaintiff to present rebuttal evidence, provided written
decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law, and provided for appeal to state
court); Mason v. Arizona, 260 F. Supp. 2d 807, 821 (D. Ariz. 2003) (holding members of
chiropractic licensing board enjoyed absolute immunity because the proceedings provided
adequate safeguards). But see Moore v. Gunnison Valley Hosp., 310 F.3d 1315, 1319 (10th
Cir. 2002) (refusing to extend absolute judicial immunity to a hospital's peer review com-
mittee because the process lacked sufficient procedural protections).
349. Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 1999).
350. Id. at 1008.
351. Id. at 1009
352. Id. at 1010.
353. Id. at 1011.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1009.
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ployers terminated her employment at the clinics.356 The plaintiff then
brought a § 1983 action claiming the board's conduct violated her due-
process rights.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the board members were entitled to
absolute immunity. In the court's view, the board members performed
functions similar to those of the judicial process. 357 Moreover, it con-
cluded that sufficient safeguards existed in the regulatory process to con-
trol unconstitutional conduct. 358 To support this conclusion, the court
pointed out that the board consisted of five members appointed by the
governor to staggered five-year terms, four of whom were licensed veteri-
narians and the fifth, a lay member. 359 The statute creating the board
empowered it to conduct investigations, hold hearings, administer oaths,
receive evidence, issue subpoenas, make factual and legal determinations,
and enter orders consistent with those findings. 360 The court also noted
that the plaintiff was subpoenaed to a hearing at which her second em-
ployer agreed to terminate her employment. 361
The court, however, did not compare the procedural protections at is-
sue to those evaluated by the Supreme Court in Butz and Cleavinger.
Indeed, the case seems to allow a level of safeguards below those pro-
vided in Cleavinger. As far as the decision reports, unlike the procedural
safeguards in Butz, the plaintiff received no notice of the charges against
her prior to the adverse action, had no right to attend the "meetings," had
no right to representation, had no right to discovery, had no right to pre-
sent evidence, had no right to call witnesses, had no right to cross-ex-
amine witnesses, had no right to the application of the rules of evidence
or adherence to precedent, had no transcript of the proceedings, had no
statement of findings and conclusions of fact and law, and had no right to
appellate review. In short, it appears that the procedural protections
were minimal in comparison to those of the administrative proceedings in
Butz, which closely paralleled the judicial process.
In addition to improperly extending absolute judicial immunity to non-
judicial proceedings, this line of cases illustrates the confusion that arises
from the lack of clear standards for evaluating the sufficiency of procedu-
ral safeguards. In these cases, each regulatory scheme has its own combi-
nation of protections. For this reason, each scheme must be carefully
evaluated to determine whether it offers sufficient protections to justify
absolute immunity. This case-by-case approach is perhaps consistent with
the Supreme Court's decisions in Butz and Cleavinger. But it reveals the
inherent difficulty in the Court's approach because of the infinitely varia-
ble procedures. For example, one scheme may provide notice and the
opportunity to present evidence, but it may not adhere to the rules of
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1011.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 1010.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1011.
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evidence or follow precedent. Another scheme may follow stricter rules
of evidence, but it may be subject to increased political pressures. How
are the lower courts to determine which combination of features justifies
absolute immunity and which do not?
Lacking clear standards, the lower courts are left to make ad hoc deci-
sions based on the individual characteristics of the specific proceedings.
But this approach leads to unpredictability and confusion, generating liti-
gation over the question whether absolute or qualified immunity should
apply. This unnecessary litigation defeats the purpose of the immunity
doctrines, which are designed to facilitate the early resolution of civil-
rights litigation so that defendants are spared not just the burden of liabil-
ity, but also the burden of litigation.362
The decisions considering medical-disciplinary systems illustrate this
problem. Because every system must be individually evaluated, immu-
nity issues are repeatedly litigated with unpredictable results. For exam-
ple, some peer-review systems are found to have sufficient procedural
safeguards to justify the application of judicial immunity,363 while others
have not.364 Similarly, some medical-board procedures have been found
to support the application of judicial immunity,365 while others have been
found insufficient.366 In other words, the Butz/Cleavenger analysis frus-
trates the goal of facilitating the early resolution of the immunity defense
by prolonging litigation over which immunity to apply. As will be ex-
plained in Part IV, a significant advantage of applying qualified immunity
is the simplification of civil-rights litigation to ensure that honest officials
receive the early resolution they deserve. 367
3. Land-Use Officials
In cases involving the appropriate immunity defense for land-use offi-
cials, the circuits conflict as illustrated by cases in the Ninth and Third
362. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) ("Moreover, because 'the entitlement is
an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability' . . . we repeatedly have
stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible state in
litigation." (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982).
363. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding the peer review
system supported the application of absolute immunity); accord Kwoun v. S.E. Mo. Prof.
Standards Rev. Org., 811 F.2d 401, 409 (8th Cir. 1987).
364. Moore v. Gunnison Valley Hosp., 310 F.3d 1315, 1317-20 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding
peer review system failed to provide sufficient procedural safeguards to support the appli-
cation of absolute immunity); Braswell v. Haywood Reg'l Med. Ctr, 352 F. Supp. 2d 639,
649-50 (W.D.N.C. 2005) (finding that the hospital's peer-review board lacked the charac-
teristics of a judicial body required to apply absolute immunity).
365. Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1007 (Qth Cir 1999) (holding medical-board mem-
bers entitled to absolute immunity because the board procedures provided sufficient safe-
guards); accord Wang v. N.H. Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 701 (1st Cir. 1995);
Watts v. Burkhart, 987 F.2d 269, 278 (6th Cir. 1992); Bettencourt v. Bd. of Registration in
Med., 904 F.2d 772, 784 (1st Cir. 1990); Horwitz v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 822 F.2d
1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1987).
366. DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 301-02 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding medical-board
procedures lacked sufficient safeguards to support absolute immunity).
367. See infra Part IV.B.
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Circuits.368 In the Ninth Circuit, the decisions apply the Butz/Cleavinger
analysis to determine whether the proceedings provide sufficient proce-
dural safeguards to justify the application of absolute immunity.369 While
in my view the Ninth Circuit properly attempts to apply the Supreme
Court's precedent, these cases illustrate the unpredictability of this ap-
proach. In the Third Circuit, on the other hand, absolute immunity has
been consistently extended to zoning-board members without any analy-
sis of whether the proceedings are comparable to the judicial process as
required by the Butz/Cleavinger approach.370 While this approach leads
to predictable results, it seems to squarely contradict the Supreme
Court's requirements. The following discussion compares these conflict-
ing approaches.
Following the guidance of the Supreme Court decisions in Butz and
Cleavinger, the Ninth Circuit has extended absolute judicial immunity to
land-use officials when the proceedings are found to be comparable to
those of the judicial process. So, for example, the court applied absolute
immunity where the proceedings were adversarial, the decision-makers
were insulated from the political process, and the procedural rules were
similar to judicial proceedings. 371 But it refused to extend absolute im-
munity where board members were elected and therefore subject to polit-
ical pressures. 372 The district courts within the circuit have, of course,
attempted to follow the same analytical approach. 373 The problem (as
explained above with respect to the licensing cases) is that there is no
clear standard to determine which combination of features is sufficient to
justify the application of absolute immunity. In short, the Ninth Circuit
cases apply the required legal analysis, which leads to unpredictable
results.
368. A related issue is the proper characterization of land-use decisions. See Margue-
rite N. Pryzblyski, Note, Characterization of Land Use Decisions: A Zone of Uncertainty,
37 VILL. L. REv. 663, 684-707 (1992). This issue arises when the courts must determine
whether a land-use official is performing a legislative function or executive function. For
example, where a land-use agency is formulating a plan, it may be characterized as a legis-
lative function. But where it is enforcing a restriction, it may be characterized as a judicial
function. For purposes of this article, only decisions treated as judicial in nature will be
addressed.
369. Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127, 1131, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 1999) (evaluating
land-use decisions under the Butz/Cleavinger analysis).
370. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology v. Upper Merion Twp., 270 F. Supp. 2d
633, 661-64 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding zoning-board members entitled to absolute judicial
immunity without performing the Butz/Cleavinger analysis); accord Ryan v. Lower Merion
Twp., 205 F. Supp. 2d 434, 438-39 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Zapach v. Dismuke, 134 F. Supp. 2d 682,
697 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
371. Buckles, 191 F.3d at 1131, 1134-35.
372. Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1991).
373. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. City of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135-
36 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that members of the board did not have the required separa-
tion from the political process because permit application reviews were simply one of the
functions they performed as elected officials); Hale 0 Kaula Church v. Maui Planning
Com'n, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1065 (D. Haw. 2002) (finding proceedings were comparable
to those of the judicial process and thus supported absolute immunity).
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In contrast to the Ninth Circuit decisions, distric- court decisions from
the Third Circuit have consistently held that zoning officials are entitled
to absolute judicial immunity.374 But the decisions fail to analyze the suf-
ficiency of the procedural safeguards as required by the ButziCleavinger
approach. 375 Instead, they all cite earlier Seventh Circuit 376 and Penn-
sylvania Superior Court377 decisions to support their conclusion. How-
ever, the reliance on these decisions is misplaced. The Seventh Circuit
case, Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Board, was not a § 1983 case
and did not address the question of immunity.378 The state case, Urbano
v. Meneses, was a § 1983 case that addressed the immunity issue. But it
was decided in 1981, before the 1985 Cleavinger decision refused to ex-
tend judicial immunity to proceedings lacking the procedural hallmarks
of the judicial process. 37 9 Since the recent cases ignore the required Butz/
Cleavinger analysis, they are wrongly decided. In other words, these
cases provide predictable results but apply an erroneous legal analysis.
While the Third Circuit cases fail to apply the required analysis, they
highlight the need to consider the political context of land-use decisions.
For example, in the Zapach case, the plaintiff sought a special exception
from zoning for a mobile-home park.380 At the public hearing on the mat-
ter, 200 people showed up and twenty-five registered to testify, mostly
against the exception. 381 In Associates in Obstetrics, the issue was the
closing of.an abortion clinic in violation of the plaintiff's rights to due
process and equal protection. 382 Obviously, both cases were politically
charged. Yet in neither case did the court consider whether the decision-
makers enjoyed the insulation from the political process required by Butz
and Cleavinger to support the application of judicial immunity.383
Unfortunately, when the courts struggle to follow the Supreme Court's
guidance, the results can be somewhat unpredictable when the procedu-
ral protections fall somewhere between Butz and Cleavinger.384 For ex-
374. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 661-62 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(holding zoning-board members entitled to absolute judicial immunity); accord Ryan, 205
F. Supp. 2d at 438-39; Zapach, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
375. Both Zapach, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 697 n.14, and Ryan, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 439, out-
lined the procedures involved. But neither cited Butz nor Cleavinger nor performed the
analysis of procedures required by these decisions.
376. See Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 181 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999).
377. See Urbano v. Meneses, 431 A.2d 308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
378. Omnipoint, 181 F.3d at 403. Omnipoint involved the denial of a special exception
to a wireless telephone service provider. Id. The plaintiff sued to obtain the exception and
succeeded. Id. But it was not a money damages action against the board members. There-
fore, it did not raise the question of the applicable immunity defense.
379. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 206 (1985).
380. Zapach, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
381. Id.
382. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 655-60.
383. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978); Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 203.
384. See Thomas v. City of Dallas, 175 F.3d 358, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding the
volunteer board enforcing urban-rehabilitation standards was entitled to absolute judicial
immunity for ordering the demolition of plaintiffs' house because there were sufficient
procedural safeguards including: adversarial proceedings, a right to receive notice, the right
to present and cross examine witnesses, the requirement that witnesses testify under oath,
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ample, a recent Florida case extended absolute judicial immunity to a
local planning board where the landowners claimed their constitutional
rights were violated by the arbitrary application of building regula-
tions.385 The court held that sufficient protections were provided since
the members were not elected, the parties were permitted to present evi-
dence and cross examine witnesses, were entitled to be informed of the
decision, and had the right to appeal. But this process also had many of
the deficiencies: apparently there was no right to be represented by coun-
sel, no right to compel the attendance of witnesses, no right to discovery,
no requirement that testimony be given under oath, no application of the
rules of evidence, no verbatim transcript of the proceedings, no written
decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law, and no requirement
of adherence to precedent. In short, as far as the decision reports, the
procedural protections fell below the standards of the judicial process
that justified the application of absolute immunity in Butz.386
Moreover, as with the licensing-board cases, the process afforded in the
various land use schemes varies greatly. Since each case requires a dis-
crete analysis, and since the courts lack a clear standard to apply, litiga-
tion is generated over the question whether the particular combination of
procedural safeguards is sufficient to justify absolute immunity for each
local, regional, state, and interstate agency. Again, the litigation would
be streamlined by the uniform application of the qualified immunity
defense.387
As the preceding discussion explains, the lower courts have wrongly
expanded judicial immunity in two directions: (1) to adjuncts and appoin-
tees within the judicial system who do not perform the judicial function;
and (2) to decision-makers outside of the judicial system where procedu-
ral safeguards are lacking. These decisions depart from the Supreme
Court's directive that absolute judicial immunity be sparingly applied to
cases within the historical scope of the immunity defense in 1871 where
the official performs a judicial act in the discharge of the judicial function,
and where procedural safeguards are comparable to those of the judicial
process. Specifically, the court adjuncts and appointees discussed in Part
III.A do not perform functions that enjoyed absolute judicial immunity in
1871. Indeed, many of these functions did not even exist at the time.
and the right to appeal to state district courts.) The court in Thomas also concluded that
the board members were insulated from the political process because they were appointed
by members of the city council, not elected. The court acknowledged that the board was
not bound by precedent but was required to follow specific standards. But the court did
not address other procedural safeguards, including the right to representation, the right to
discovery, the application of the rules of evidence, a transcript or record of the proceed-
ings, or the right to a written decision. Moreover, one might be skeptical about the politi-
cal insulation of a board of volunteers appointed for two-year terms by members of the city
council.
385. Berkos v. Village of Wellington, No. 02-81102-CV, 2003 WL 21383886 (S.D. Fla.
2003); see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (holding that arbitrary
application of local land-use rules supported a constitutional claim).
386. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
387. See infra Part IV.B.
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There were no psychiatrists, psychologists, GALs, social workers, or pa-
role and probation officers. These officials cannot meet the burden of
proving that their function is that of a judge who resolves disputes be-
tween parties because that is not their job. Instead, they function prima-
rily to perform investigations and provide information to the courts.
These functions are investigative and testimonial, not adjudicative. Fur-
ther, the decision-makers outside of the judicial system discussed in Part
III.B also fail to meet the burden of showing that they are entitled to
absolute judicial immunity. A key requirement of the historical absolute
immunity doctrine is the presence of political insulation and procedural
safeguards to offset the risk of governmental abuse. Where those protec-
tions are lacking, absolute immunity should not apply.
IV. THE UNWARRANTED EXTENSION OF ABSOLUTE
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY SHOULD BE CORRECTED
BY THE UNIFORM APPLICATION
OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
As the preceding discussion has shown, the lower courts have ex-
panded absolute judicial immunity to cases where it should not apply ei-
ther because the official was not performing a judicial act in the discharge
of a judicial function or because the proceedings lacked sufficient proce-
dural safeguards. As the following discussion shows, qualified immunity
should be applied in all these cases for two reasons. First, qualified im-
munity furthers public policy by striking the proper balance between the
vigorous enforcement of civil-rights legislation and the protection of gov-
ernment officials from harassing litigation. And second, the consistent
application of qualified immunity will reverse the undue complexity in
the law and ensure that defendants enjoy an efficient defense at the earli-
est stage of the litigation.
A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FURTHERS PUBLIC POLICY BY STRIKING
THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS
AND SHIELDING PUBLIC OFFICIALS
FROM EXCESSIVE LITIGATION
The over-extension of absolute judicial immunity violates public policy
in two respects. First, it frustrates the purposes of civil-rights laws by de-
nying victims a remedy, failing to deter unconstitutional conduct, and
stymieing the development of constitutional standards. Second, this sac-
rifice of civil-rights enforcement is not necessary to protect the honest
public servant from litigation because the qualified-immunity defense has
evolved to provide protection to all but the most willful or incompetent
wrongdoer.
The unjustified expansion of absolute judicial immunity frustrates the
policies of § 1983. The primary purpose of § 1983 is to "give a remedy to
parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an
[Vol. 59
A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent
official's abuse of his position. ' ' 388 Absolute immunity defeats that pur-
pose by denying victims "the very remedy which it appears Congress
sought to create. '38 9 The Court has recognized that absolute immunity
leaves victims uncompensated and justice unfulfilled. In addition to com-
pensating victims, § 1983 liability deters government misconduct. Accord-
ing to Justice White, "It should hardly need stating that, ordinarily,
liability in damages for unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has
the very desirable effect of deterring such conduct. Indeed, this was pre-
cisely the proposition upon which § 1983 was enacted. ' 390 This deterrent
effect is frustrated by absolute immunity.
Beyond providing a remedy and deterring misconduct, civil-rights liti-
gation gives concrete meaning to abstract constitutional language.391
Since 1961 when Monroe v. Pape392 was announced, § 1983 litigation has
been largely responsible for the evolution of constitutional rights.393
Through this litigation, courts define the rights that protect people from
government misconduct and regulate the discretion of officials to inflict
injury.394 As Dean John C. Jeffries explains, "the capacity of constitu-
tional doctrine to adapt to evolving economic, political, and social condi-
tions is a great strength. '395 As he observed, "most of the rights
regulating a government official's discretion to inflict injury upon individ-
uals have been established in constitutional tort actions. ' 396
Absolute immunity stifles the development of constitutional law.
When absolute immunity applies in civil rights actions, courts dismiss the
action at the beginning of litigation without addressing the merits of the
388. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 165, 172 (1961). The compensation justification for con-
stitutional tort actions has been criticized on the ground that it leads courts to narrowly
interpret constitutional rights in order to prevent financial burdens on the government.
Jeffries, supra note 24, at 89-90. But Dean Jeffries recognizes that when qualified immu-
nity applies, this risk is minimized. Indeed, in his view, qualified immunity promotes the
development of constitutional law. Id. at 108-09.
389. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 478, 434 (1978) (White, J., concurring).
390. Id. at 442 (White, J., concurring); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 656 (1980). The deterrent effect of monetary awards has been challenged by Professor
Daryl J. Levinson. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). In his view, the deter-
rent effect of actions for money damages is limited because governments do not respond to
monetary liability in the same way that private actors do. Id. at 356-57. While private
actors seek to maximize financial gain and will therefore adjust their behavior in response
to financial costs, government institutions respond to political costs and benefits. Id. at
359. Since the political effects of constitutional tort actions are unpredictable, their deter-
rent effects are uncertain. Id. at 379-380. But see Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making
the Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV.
845 (2001) (arguing that constitutional tort actions are an effective deterrent to govern-
ment misconduct).
391. See imbler, 424 U.S. at 420.
392. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
393. Id. at 223 n.32.
394. Park, supra note 24, at 422-24.
395. Id. at 403-04.
396. Id. at 446.
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constitutional claim.397 In this way, absolute immunity freezes the law in
a state of perpetual uncertainty. Qualified immunity, on the other hand,
requires courts to decide the substantive law at issue and develop consti-
tutional standards. 398 Indeed, the threshold question in the qualified-im-
munity analysis is whether the defendant's alleged misconducts violated
the Constitution.399 This analysis insures the development of constitu-
tional doctrine and the evolution of constitutional norms for official
conduct.400
Second, the frustration of civil-rights enforcement is not necessary to
protect honest officials from harassing litigation. Today, qualified immu-
nity provides defendants with a potent and efficient defense to baseless
litigation. While the common-law qualified-immunity defense in 1871
was based on good faith and reasonableness, 40 1 the Court has trans-
formed the doctrine into an objective standard that can be established at
the earliest stage of the litigation, thus relieving the defendant not only
from the burden of liability but also from the burden of litigation.40 2 In
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court "completely reformulated qualified im-
munity," replacing the subjective standard with an objective standard
based on clearly established law.40 3 The Court candidly explained that the
subjective standard was incompatible with the need to eliminate the bur-
dens of discovery and litigation. 4 4 Under the Harlow standard, an officer
is liable only when he or she violates "clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 40 5
If courts announce a new constitutional rule, they will impose liability
only for future violations, which officers can avoid by complying with the
newly established law. This approach, according to Dean Jeffries, allows
innovations in the evolution of constitutional law without "fear of sub-
397. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). The plaintiff had been sterilized
pursuant to a court order sought by her mother. Id. at 351-53. She was told she was having
her appendix removed. Id. at 353. After she married and was unable to become pregnant,
she discovered the truth. Id. She sued the judge who had granted the order on the grounds
that his issuance of the order violated her constitutional rights. Id. The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court finding of absolute immunity without considering the merits of
the plaintiff's constitutional claim. Id. at 355-64; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259, 279 (1993). In Buckley, the plaintiff alleged a violation of due process when the prose-
cutor had fabricated evidence in order to convict the plaintiff. Id. at 262-63. The Court
addressed the immunity defenses without resolving whether the misconduct violated the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 267-79.
398. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see also Park, supra note 24 (ex-
plaining how constitutional standards are developed through civil-rights litigation).
399. City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 n.5 (1998); see also Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002).
At~f ...... C ' TTC - OAI AI - C (1 ROu.sell....,. D ,ll 1Q21 F3A QO 106-07 "AM
UU. rw, a, .,. Ud.,,. at oL-.'--t l.J 1 ,. flua..,n l. I .. Jt Uk, -I, J*J.f
Cir. 1999).
401. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
245 (1974); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002).
402. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814-18.
403. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
404. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.
405. Id. at 818.
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jecting the government to excessive costs. '406
The application of qualified-immunity to most government officials re-
flects the Court's view that a balance should be struck between vindicat-
ing the rights of citizens and protecting officials exercising their
discretion.40 7 The Court has found that "[i]n most cases, qualified immu-
nity is sufficient to 'protect officials who are required to exercise their
discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous ex-
ercise of official authority.' "408 As Justice White observed, the current
qualified immunity defense "provides ample protection to all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."'40 9 For this
reason, the defendant bears the burden of overcoming the Court's pre-
sumption that qualified immunity applies. 410
Along with the adoption of an objective standard for qualified immu-
nity, the Court has developed procedural safeguards to insure that the
defense can be resolved at the earliest stages of litigation. The reformula-
tion of the qualified-immunity defense from a subjective standard to an
objective standard was designed to avoid disruption of the government
and permit the resolution of weak claims on summary judgment.411 When
the defendant raises the qualified-immunity defense by a motion to dis-
miss or motion for summary judgment, discovery on other issues is
stayed.412 If the trial court rejects the immunity defense, the defendant is
entitled to an immediate interlocutory appeal. 413 Thus, qualified immu-
nity affords defendants an effective means of avoiding unnecessary litiga-
tion so that the extraordinary protection of absolute immunity is no
longer necessary.
In addition to the protection of qualified immunity, defendants can also
rely on the courts' effective procedural tools to control burdensome liti-
gation. As the Court explained in denying President Clinton's claim for
immunity for conduct before taking office, most frivolous lawsuits are dis-
posed of at the pleading or summary-judgment stage with little or no in-
volvement by the actual defendant. 414 Moreover, courts can sanction
offending litigants.415 These tools-in addition to the other safeguards of
the qualified immunity defense-are available to protect public officials
from harassing litigation.
406. Jeffries, supra note 24, at 89-90.
407. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
408. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 506 (1978)).
409. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-95 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
410. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993).
411. Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 n.8.
412. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
413. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-30 (1985).
414. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997).
415. Id. at 708-09.
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B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SIMPLIFIES AN UNJUSTIFIABLY COMPLEX
BODY OF LAW AND THEREBY PROMOTES PREDICTABILITY
AND EFFICIENCY IN CIVIL-RIGHTS LITIGATION
The over-extension of absolute immunity has introduced complexity,
conflicts, and confusion in the law. Specifically, the circuits are split on
many questions regarding the application of this defense, including
whether it applies to child-protective workers416 and to what extent it
applies to parole-board members.417 Under the current law, it is exceed-
ingly difficult to predict whether a given regulatory scheme for profes-
sional discipline41 8 or land use will support the application of the
defense. 419 The resulting uncertainty promotes and prolongs litigation.
As one scholar explained, "Lawsuits are fought if both sides think they
have a shot at winning. The more stable and certain the law, the less the
chance that both sides will think they can win. '' 420 Simply put, complexity
has costs. 421
While complexity always has costs, sometimes the benefits justify the
burden. For example, we could certainly have a simpler body of law gov-
erning the death penalty, but we are willing to sacrifice efficiency to pre-
vent the wrongful execution of an innocent person. In other words,
sometimes complexity is desirable. The complexity and unpredictability
created by the unwarranted expansion of absolute judicial immunity doc-
trine might be acceptable if the doctrine were supported by precedent or
public policy. But, as the foregoing discussion has shown, the expansion
of absolute judicial immunity has substantial costs without discernable
benefits. The injection of uncertainty as to the applicable immunity un-
necessarily prolongs litigation and burdens both the litigants and the
courts. Conversely, the uniform application of qualified immunity would
streamline the proceedings. Qualified immunity properly balances the
need to protect government functions against the need to protect individ-
ual civil rights. It provides an affirmative defense that can be efficiently
resolved in the initial stages of the proceeding to eliminate not just the
burden of liability but also the burden of litigation.422
416. See supra Part III.A.2.
417. See supra Part III.B.1.
418. See supra Part III.B.2.
419. See supra Part III.B.3.
420. Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PIrr. L. REv. 673,
690 (1990), quoted in J. Clark Kelso. A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HAS-
TINGS L. J. 433, 448 (1994).
421. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures, 42
DUKE L. J. 1 (1992).
422. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) ("Moreover, because 'the entitlement is
an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability' . . . we repeatedly have
stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible state in
litigation." (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982).
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V. CONCLUSION
The lower courts' expansion of judicial immunity cannot be supported
by the historic common law, Supreme Court precedent, or public policy.
By extending judicial immunity to functions that did not enjoy absolute
immunity under the common law in 1871, the courts have strayed from
the guiding principle that the common law of 1871 is the only justification
for granting immunity in § 1983 actions.423 By extending judicial immu-
nity to officials who do not perform judicial acts in the discharge of the
judicial function, the lower courts have departed from the teachings of
Stump v. Sparkman.42 4 And by applying judicial immunity in cases lack-
ing rigorous procedural safeguards, the lower courts have departed from
the standards established in Butz v. Economou 425 and Cleavinger v.
Saxner.
4 2 6
This over-expansion of judicial immunity violates public policy by de-
nying compensation to victims of unconstitutional misconduct, by not
holding officials accountable for their misconduct, by failing to deter fu-
ture misconduct, and by frustrating the development of constitutional
standards. It introduces unnecessary conflicts and complexity into the law
that defeat the purpose of the immunity defense. In addition to greatly
simplifying this area of the law, adoption of a qualified-immunity regime
would provide the intended remedy to victims while providing and effi-
cient and effective defense to all but the most willful and incompetent
defendants.
423. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997); Buckley, v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
268 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-
18 (1976).
424. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
425. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
426. 474 U.S. 193 (1985).
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